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I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),1 seeking to
make attorneys and accountants liable for losses at corrupt savings and
loan associations (S&Ls or thrifts), has filed an unprecedented number of
malpractice suits against these professionals.2 Many of these suits resem-
ble the following hypothetical case of Charley K., a successful real-
estate-developer-turned-savings-and-loan-kingpin.
In the early 1980s, Charley bought Jefferson Savings & Loan, a
small thrift that until then had only made single-family home loans.3
Charley believed he could make more money by directly investing depos-
itors' funds in riskier ventures. Under Charley's management, Jefferson
S&L bought 100 acres of undeveloped land on the outskirts of a large
1. The FDIC is a federal agency that insures bank accounts up to $100,000 per depositor,
examines bank financial statements and acts as receiver for insolvent institutions. Iwana
Rademaekers, Historical Perspective, in BANKS AND THRIFTS: GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT
AND RECEIVERSHIP § 1.01, § 1.04[l] (Barry S. Zisman ed., 1992). In 1989, the FDIC ab-
sorbed most of the insurance, regulatory and receiver functions for thrifts formerly exercised
by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), which had become insol-
vent. See id. § 1.04[2], at 1-16. Congress created the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC)
effective August 1989 to act as receiver for thrifts that failed after that month. See Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat.
183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
2. The FDIC listed 49 pending suits as of May 1990 that included claims for attorney or
accountant malpractice. See FDIC, Professional Liability Litigation (May 23, 1990) (unpub-
lished report, on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review); see also Linda Himelstein, S&L
Spotlight Focusing on Malpractice, RECORDER, Nov. 20, 1990, at 1 (reporting that FDIC
planned to pursue as many as 140 new claims against lawyers for failed S&Ls).
3. See infra note 16.
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city for $50 million. Unfortunately for Charley, the real estate market
crashed, and the land value declined to $40 million. Because Jefferson
S&L's capital was only $10 million to start with, the $10 million loss
wiped out all of Jefferson's capital. The institution was-on paper, at
least-worth nothing.
Charley should have reported Jefferson's insolvency to the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), which would have
closed the thrift. Instead, Charley made a secret deal with speculator X,
who owned land near Jefferson's holdings. Charley, as an individual,
would buy Ms. X's land for $50 million (which was $10 million more
than market value) if Ms. X would buy Jefferson's land for $60 million
(which was $20 million more than market value).' Charley agreed that
his S&L would make a $10 million nonrecourse loan' to Ms. X to buy the
land without putting any cash into the deal. Besides being an unsound
business deal, the transaction violated federal law, and Charley knew it.
First, Ms. X could not legally borrow $10 million from Jefferson S&L
because that exceeded the maximum amount the thrift was allowed to
lend to one person. Second, Charley intended to borrow money from
Jefferson to buy Ms. X's land. This not only exceeded the maximum that
the S&L could lend to one borrower, but also would raise regulatory
concerns about preferential insider lending.7 Charley covered up these
problems by making the loans to Ms. X and himself through a handful of
"dummy" corporations controlled by "straw" parties. The loan applica-
tions named neither Charley nor Ms. X.
Charley hired two prestigious law firms to handle the loan docu-
mentation. He paid more in fees to split the work, when one firm could
have done the job more efficiently, so that neither firm would suspect the
true nature of the overall transaction.8 If lawyers at either firm had
scratched below the surface, they would have discovered the connections
between the dummy corporations, Charley and Ms. X, but neither firm
did. The land deals closed, resulting in a $10 million "profit" to Jeffer-
4. See infra notes 19, 118 and accompanying text for descriptions of similar land
transactions.
5. With a nonrecourse loan, the real estate is the only collateral and the borrower is not
personally liable in the event of default. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1057 (6th ed. 1990).
6. Any bank borrower is limited to secured loans totalling 10% of capital, or in this
hypothetical, $1 million. See 12 U.S.C. § 84(a)(2) (1988). This limit applies to federal S&Ls as
well. Id. § 1464(u)(1) (Supp. III 1991).
7. Loans to bank insiders may not exceed loan limits to a single borrower and must be
made on substantially the same terms as transactions with noninsiders. Id. § 375b(1), (3)
(1988). This section applies equally to federal S&Ls. Id. § 1468(b)(1) (Supp. III 1991).
8. See infra note 346 and accompanying text for an example of an S&L that changed
accounting and law firms to avoid detection of fraud.
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son. Because the sale on paper appeared to be an arms-length transac-
tion, Jefferson's Big Six accounting firm9 approved the entire $10 million
as profit-an overnight doubling of the thrift's capital.
Charley's scheme, however, could not last indefinitely. The slump
in the real estate market worsened, forcing Charley and Ms. X to default
on $60 million in loans from Jefferson S&L. By then, the two tracts of
land were worth only $40 million together. The two bad loans wiped out
Jefferson's capital and left a $10 million negative net worth."0 The
FSLIC paid off depositors and covered the deficit out of the S&L insur-
ance fund.
Shortly after closing Jefferson S&L, FSLIC lawyers sued the two
law firms and the accounting firm to recover $20 million in losses alleg-
edly caused by the firms' negligence. According to the FSLIC, the land
deals were so obviously fraudulent that the professionals must have
"looked the other way" to protect a client and their large fees. Because
Charley was bankrupt, the well-insured professionals were the "deep
pockets" to which the FSLIC looked for recovery. "1 The accounting and
law firms were shocked to discover their unwitting role in Charley's and
Ms. X's fraud and embarrassed that they had not uncovered it. The
firms, however, adamantly denied liability, even if they were negligent.
The firms moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Charley's
insider fraud and concealment cut off any liability for mere negligence.1 2
The alleged negligent omission of Jefferson's attorneys and account-
ants was the failure to uncover the fraud and concealment by their cli-
ent's top management. Professionals in this situation have raised what
this Comment refers to as the "insider fraud defense." Part II of this
Comment examines the role of attorneys and accountants in the S&L
crisis and defines the "insider fraud defense." Part III compares the
facts, procedural background and reasoning of the two leading cases on
the insider fraud defense: FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers [sic], 13 which
9. The nation's six largest accounting firms are Arthur Andersen & Co., KPMG Peat
Marwick, Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte & Touche, Price Waterhouse and Ernst & Young.
10. In this hypothetical, the total loans on the two pieces of property were $60 million and
the value of the property was $40 million, leaving a $20 million deficiency. Ten million dollars
in capital or stockholders' equity less $20 million in loan losses leaves an overall negative net
worth of $10 million.
11. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
12. See, eg., Buttitta v. Newell, 531 N.E.2d 957, 959-60 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (stating that
knowing, intentional violation of usury law precluded malpractice recovery from attorney who
negligently advised that interest rate was lawful).
13. 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992). The court of appeals misspelled the defendant's name,
O'Melveny & Myers. This Comment uses the correct spelling when referring to the party's
name.
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rejected the defense, and FDIC v. Ernst & Young, 14 which allowed it.
Part IV explores the bases in case law for the defense and applies the
precedents to S&L fraud and professional malpractice. Finally, this
Comment concludes that courts should allow the insider fraud defense
when top management dominated the thrift and successfully concealed
its wrongdoing from outside professionals.
II. THE FDIC VERSUS S&L ATrORNEYS AND ACCOUNTANTS
The S&L debacle will be an enduring blemish on the integrity of the
legal and accounting professions. 5 Nonetheless, deregulation,' 6 insider
fraud 7 and unchecked massive real estate lending 8 contributed to many
more S&L failures than did legal and accounting malpractice. In many
cases the S&L owners defrauded investors, creditors and the government
through accounting sleight of hand that transformed worthless real es-
14. 967 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992).
15. "There is little doubt that the modem trend towards white collar crime is too often
aided and abetted, if not promoted outright, by members of the legal profession." JOSEPH W.
COTCHETr & STEPHEN P. Pizzo, THE ETHICS GAP 88 (1991); see also Nancy Rutter, Dirty
Hands, CAL. LAW., Jan. 1992, at 30, 83 (quoting statement by legal ethics expert that "'there
is something wrong with the loyalty concept when it leads to disgust and disgrace, as it has in
the S&L debacle' ").
16. S&Ls traditionally took in passbook deposits, on which they paid a regulated interest
rate, and used the deposits to make home loans, a safe investment. MILES A. COBB, FEDERAL
REGULATION OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS: ENFORCEMENT POWERS AND PROCEDURES
1.03[3] (1984). The thrift industry underwent massive change in the late 1970s and 1980s, as
described by investigative reporter Stephen Pizzo:
The interest rate cap, designed to help the housing sector, became a serious handicap
for thrifts in the 1970s. The wildfire of inflation that then swept the economy put
savings and loans in a bind because by 1979 inflation was running at 13.3 percent but
thrifts were limited to paying only 5.5 percent on deposits, and depositors were not
willing to invest their money at such low rates.
STEPHEN PIZzo ET AL., INSIDE JOB: THE LOOTING OF AMERICA'S SAVINGS AND LOANS 11
(1989).
In 1982, Congress passed the Gan-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act, Pub. L. No.
97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), which
allowed S&Ls to offer high-interest money market accounts. See 12 U.S.C. § 3503(c) (1988).
To earn higher returns in order to be able to pay out the higher rates, thrifts were allowed to
invest up to 40% of their assets in nonresidential real estate. See id § 1464(c)(1)(B) (1988),
amended by id § 1464(c)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1990) (limiting such loans to 10% of assets). The
commercial investments were much riskier than home loans and made the thrifts vulnerable to
enormous losses. Pizzo ET AL., supra, at 12.
17. "[M]any of the 'entrepreneurs' attracted [to S&L ownership] by these changes [in reg-
ulation] were actually con men intent upon draining as much money from the system as they
could. ... " Pizzo ET AL., supra note 16, at 13; see also MICHAEL WALDMAN, WHO ROBBED
AMERICA? A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE SAVINGS & LOAN SCANDAL 5 (1990) ("Prosecutors
believe that these S&L high-flyers weren't just frivolous, they were fraudulent. At as many as
six out of every ten failed S&Ls, insiders engaged in serious misconduct.").
18. See infra notes 19, 73, 118.
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tate into paper profits.19 Whatever the primary cause of S&L failures,
often the best source of recovery-the only "deep pocket"-is the mal-
practice insurance policies of outside professionals.20 Suits brought by
the FDIC and other S&L bailout agencies21 against attorneys and ac-
countants have produced more than a dozen multi-million dollar settle-
ments,22 which lightens the estimated $200 billion-plus taxpayer burden
of the S&L crisis.23 The litigation is also politically popular because of
the perception-true in some cases-that lawyers and accountants either
turned a blind eye toward their clients' misdeeds, or worse, actively aided
19. Authors Paul Pilzer and Robert Deitz described some of the common fraudulent land
deals among S&L owners and developers:
[T]hrift owners could trade bad loans among themselves, so that if the regulators
happened to show up unexpectedly, the books would look clean. This practice was
known as the "dead horse for a dead cow" trade in which a "rolling loan gathers no
loss." Several thrift owners would get together and, with the help of friendly apprais-
ers, form a "daisy chain" to "flip" a piece of property back and forth among
themselves.
PAUL Z. PILZER & ROBERT DErrz, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE
S&L MESS 93 (1989). For additional discussion of the S&L debacle, see MARTIN MAYER,
THE GREATEST-EVER BANK ROBBERY (1990).
20. Charles F. Byrd & Isabella W. Sammons, FDIC Legal Action Against Attorneys and
Other Professionals, 108 BANKING L.J. 420, 420 (1991).
21. In addition to the S&L suits it has filed since August 1989, the FDIC took over FSLIC
litigation when it absorbed that agency. See supra note 1. As of September 1990, the RTC
had filed 10 suits against lawyers and 15 suits against accountants. See Byrd & Sammons,
supra note 20, at 421. See supra note 2 for a summary of FDIC activity. A third agency, the
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), filed and settled one of the largest S&L professional negli-
gence suits to date. See infra note 22. This Comment mainly discusses FDIC suits, which are
more numerous than those of the other bailout agencies. See supra note 2. Most of the discus-
sion, however, applies equally to other S&L and bank bailout litigation.
22. See Susan Beck & Michael Orey, They Got What They Deserved, Am. LAW., May
1992, at 68 (reporting OTS settlement of Lincoln S&L claim with New York law firm Kaye,
Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler for $41 million); James S. Granelli, Law Firm to Pay $51
Million in Keating Case, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1993, at Dl (reporting RTC settlement of $51
million with Cleveland-based Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue); Robert A. Rosenblatt, Auditor
Pays $400 Million for Not Signaling S&L Crisis, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1992, at AI (reporting
joint OTS, RTC and FDIC settlement with Ernst & Young for audits of several failed thrifts,
including Lincoln S&L); Steven Wilmsen & Robert Kowalski, Token Sums OK'd in Silverado
Accord, DENY. POST, June 19, 1991, at IA (reporting FDIC settlement of Silverado thrift suit
with law firm for $16.5 million and accounting firm for $20 million); FDIC, Professional Lia-
bility Law Suits Against Individual Attorneys/Law Firms, Closed Cases and Settlement Infor-
mation (Dec. 13, 1990) (unpublished report, on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review)
(listing, among others, following settlements: $35.9 million with Philadelphia law firm Blank,
Rome, Comisky & McCauley in Florida S&L suit; $9.85 million and $9.6 million with Dallas
law firm Jenkins & Gilchrest in claims involving two Texas S&Ls); see also David Newdorf,
FDIC Stumbles in Malpractice Trials, RECORDER, Jan. 3, 1991, at 1, 6 (reporting that profes-
sional liability recoveries from lawyers and law firms totalled $60 million in 1989).
23. PILZER & DErrz, supra note 19, at 16 (estimating bailout at more than $200 billion);
WALDMAN, supra note 17, at ix (estimating bailout at $500 billion).
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and abetted fraud. 24 The lawyers and accountants contend, however,
that they are not legally responsible because insider fraud caused the
losses.25
In addition to the usual tort defenses,26 attorneys and accountants
named in the FDIC suits have asserted the insider fraud defense. The
defense is based on the intentional and fraudulent conduct of the owners
or top managers of a thrift, which, under theories of estoppel,27 in pari
delicto,28 contributory or comparative negligence,29 or proximate
24. A professional who actively assisted a client's fraud should not be able to avoid liabil-
ity using the insider fraud defense because one of the principal justifications for the defense is
balancing equities and policy considerations. See infra part IV.C. At Lincoln Savings & Loan
Association, the thrift's lawyers allegedly knew about sham real estate deals, risky loans and
backdated documents. See Beck & Orey, supra note 22, at 70-72. Nonetheless, from 1987
until Lincoln was finally shut down in April 1989, the lawyers attempted to persuade regula-
tors that Lincoln was clean and healthy. See id at 68, 70-72. The government and private
lawsuits against the firm settled long before trial, see id at 68, 73, so possible defenses were
never tested.
In Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1990), Judge Stanley
Sporkin observed: "The questions that must be asked are: Where were these professionals...
when these clearly improper transactions were being consummated? Why didn't any of them
speak up or disassociate themselves from the transactions? Where also were the outside ac-
countants and attorneys when these transactions were effectuated?" Id. at 920.
25. See, e.g., Litigation Against Professionals Will Damage U.S. Economy, Study Says, 59
Banking Rep. (BNA) 224 (Aug. 10, 1992) (stating that outside professionals "'are simply
"deep pockets" to whom some very slight fault may be attributable' "); Timothy D. Naegele,
Rabid Regulators Want Your Hide, AM. BANKER, May 27, 1992, at 4 (attributing professional
liability suits to scapegoatism).
26. The common defenses to professional negligence include: disproving any of the re-
quired elements of negligence, see infra note 36; statute of limitations; .contributory or compar-
ative negligence; release or waiver; res judicata; collateral estoppel; indemnity or contribution;
and unjust enrichment. 2 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE
§§ 17.1-.18 (3d ed. 1989).
27. See FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers [sic], 969 F.2d 744, 749 (9th Cir. 1992). The Ninth
Circuit, which rejected the defense, explained: "Under this argument the FDIC would be
estopped from making a claim against O'Melveny by the wrongdoing of the corporate insid-
ers." Id.
28. In pari delicto means "in equal fault." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at
791; see also Evans v. Cameron, 360 N.W.2d 25 (Wis. 1985) (holding that client who lied
under oath on advice of attorney could not recover damages from attQrney because client was
in pari delicto).
29. See Stratton v. Miller, 113 B.R. 205, 210 (D. Md. 1989) (holding that intentional fraud
of corporation president barred recovery from corporation's attorneys for malpractice based
on corporation's contributory negligence), aff'd sub nom. In re First Am. Mortgage Co., 900
F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
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cause,3" bars the S&L or the FDIC from recovering from outside attor-
neys and accountants who did not participate in the fraud.31
The U.S. courts of appeals in two recent decisions reached opposite
conclusions on the validity of the insider fraud defense. Applying the
defense, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in FDIC v. Ernst
& Young 32 allowed the accountants to show that their inaccurate audit
did not cause the thrift's losses because the 100% owner was engaged in
fraud.33 Rejecting the defense, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in FDIC v. O'Melveny & MeyerS [sic] 34 decided a negligent law
firm would be liable even if the S&L's two owners "'cook[ed] the
books"' and concealed their fraud from the lawyers.35
The insider fraud defense takes several forms. In O'Melveny, the
defense was an attack on the existence of a duty, which would have de-
feated the plaintiff's prima facie case of negligence. 36 In Ernst & Young,
the accountants raised the insider fraud defense to defeat the element of
causation.37 Other defendants have used variations on the defense as a
form of contributory or comparative negligence.38
30. See id. (stating that proximate causation was not proved because "it is mere specula-
tion to suggest that... the losses... would have been prevented if [the corporation's] attor-
neys had advised other directors of [the] misconduct").
31. These common-law and statutory defenses vary from state to state, and a detailed
exposition of the defenses is beyond the scope of this Comment. The insider fraud defense, as
described in this Comment, combines one or more of these state law defenses with federal
common-law principles. This Comment focuses on the federal questions. See infra part
III.A.2-3.
32. 967 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992).
33. Id at 170.
34. 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992).
35. Id at 746 (alteration in original) (quoting parties' stipulation). O'Melveny argued that
"a lawyer owes no duty to uncover a client's fraud nor to advise the client and the world of
that fraud." Id at 748.
36. Id at 748; see also I MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 26, § 8.10 ("The cause of action
for legal malpractice involves the same basic elements as any ordinary negligence action: duty,
negligent breach of duty, proximate cause and damage.").
37. 967 F.2d at 170 ('The issue... is whether either Woods or Western relied upon
Arthur Young's audit to cause injury to Western." (emphasis added)). Another question of
causation, which the cases have not yet addressed, is whether a professional who is bound by a
duty of confidentiality could stop client fraud if he or she uncovered it. See infra part IV.C.4.
38. See FDIC v. Clark, 978 F.2d 1541, 1552 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that attorneys' 19%
fault for bank's losses resulted in pro rata reduction of attorneys' liability under Colorado law).
In FDIC v. Ferguson, 982 F.2d 404 (10th Cir. 1991), a federal district court jury found that
attorney Donald P. Ferguson, who represented Home Savings & Loan in Oklahoma in two
transactions, was 15% at fault, another defendant 15%, and Home itself 70% at fault in caus-
ing loan losses. Id at 406. Under Oklahoma's comparative negligence statute, a plaintiff ad-
judged more than 50% negligent may not recover from joint tortfeasors, and so the FDIC took
nothing. Id
1172
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The insider fraud defense may affect the outcome of FDIC suits na-
tionwide in which millions of dollars in liability are at issue. The defense
also affects extrinsic public policy concerns. The FDIC has asserted that
it is "critically important" that courts reject the defense to protect the
S&L bailout.39 Attorneys have responded that disallowing the defense is
"unworkable and utterly inconsistent with the nature of the attorney-
client relationship."' The courts cannot satisfactorily resolve the issue
without considering the objectives of professional negligence law.41
III. THE INSIDER FRAUD DEFENSE
A. Background
1. The FDIC acts as receiver for failed thrifts
In most FDIC professional liability suits, the FDIC acts as receiver
for the failed S&L.42 The FDIC as receiver "stands in the shoes of the
insolvent bank"' 3 and brings claims that the entity itself could have
brought before being placed in receivership.' The claims of the FDIC as
receiver are in most cases subject to the same defenses as would have
been available against the bank or S&L. 5 In some situations, however,
the FDIC has greater rights than the insolvent institution would have
had.
4 6
FDIC professional liability suits, in bare terms, typically allege that
the outside attorneys or accountants were negligent and professional
malpractice was the proximate cause of the S&L's losses.47 In many
39. Appellants' Opening Brief at 2, O'Melveny (No. 90-55769); see infra part IV.C.1.
40. Appellee's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion of Rehearing En Bane at 14,
O'Melveny (No. 90-55769). See infra part IV.C.2-3 for a discussion of the professional-client
relationship and the professional's duty of client confidentiality.
41. See infra part IV.C.l.
42. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. III 1991) (stating that FDIC shall be appointed
receiver for any federally chartered bank or S&L); id § 1821(c)(3) (Supp. 111 1991) (stating
that state regulator may appoint FDIC receiver for any FDIC-insured state-chartered bank or
S&L).
43. FDIC v. Glickman, 450 F.2d 416, 418 (9th Cir. 1971); accord Jacobson v. FDIC, 407
F. Supp. 821, 827 (S.D. Iowa 1976).
'44. Jacobson, 407 F. Supp. at 827.
45. Camerer v. California Sav. & Commercial Bank, 4 Cal. 2d 159, 170, 48 P.2d 39, 44
(1935) ("It is... fundamental that as a general rule, the receiver takes the insolvent's property
subject to al... defenses... to which it is subject in the hands of the insolvent."); 10 AM.
JUR. 2D Banks § 764 (1963).
46. See infra part IV.B.2 for a discussion of the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine, which in some
cases gives the FDIC greater rights than a private receiver.
47. Besides professional negligence, the FDIC suits have alleged breach of fiduciary duty,
negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach of express or implied warranty, unjust
enrichment, aiding and abetting management in violations of legal and fiduciary duties, fraud
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FDIC suits the alleged negligence consists of failing to uncover and halt
illegal and fraudulent transactions by the S&L's top management.48 Be-
cause the FDIC generally has no greater rights as receiver than the S&L
had, the FDIC may only prevail against the thrift's negligent attorneys
and accountants if the S&L could have prevailed on the same claim.49
Therefore, these suits are largely the equivalent of the thrift suing its
attorney or accountant, although the FDIC brings the suit on behalf of
the thrift after the S&L becomes insolvent.
5 0
2. Federal common law governs FDIC suits
In the absence of federal constitutional provisions or federal stat-
utes, federal common law governs most actions of the FDIC because of
the need for uniform laws and policy concerning the federal banking and
S&L systems.51 The courts may look to the law of the state most closely
connected to the transaction for guidance in fashioning federal common
law, so long as state law does not conflict with the policy of maintaining
uniform federal bank and S&L law.52 The decision to create a new fed-
and deceptive trade practices. Byrd & Sammons, supra note 20, at 423-24, 433-34; Michelle D.
Monse, Ethical Issues in Representing Thrifts, 40 BUFF. L. REv. 1, 2 & n.1 (1992).
48. This was the case in FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers [sic], 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992),
and FDIC v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992). See infra part III.B.1-2 for a
detailed discussion of O'Melveny and Ernst & Young. The prospect of an attorney or account-
ant "blowing the whistle" on a client raises controversial issues of client confidentiality. See
infra part IV.C.3.
49. See Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d at 169 (stating that FDIC as receiver could recover only
those damages potentially available to failed thrift). The court in Ernst & Young viewed the
FDIC suit as essentially the same as a "case in which a [thrift] is suing its auditor." Id. But
see O'Melveny, 969 F.2d at 752 (holding that FDIC as receiver is not subject to same defenses
as S&L).
50. See Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d at 169.
51. FDIC v. Bank of San Francisco, 817 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that suit
by FDIC against issuer of letter of credit was governed by federal rather than state law); FDIC
v. Bird, 516 F. Supp. 647, 649 (D.P.R. 1981) (holding that action by FDIC against former
directors and officers of bank was governed by federal law).
Federal common law generally applies to cases affecting the government's legal relations
and proprietary interests. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67
(1943); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.7, at 229 (1985).
52. FDIC v. Palermo, 815 F.2d 1329, 1334 (10th Cir. 1987); see also FDIC v. New Hamp-
shire Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting California rule as federal common
law).
Some federal courts, in the name of judicial restraint or federalism, have applied state law
out of reluctance to create new federal common law. See, e.g., Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d at 170
(applying Texas law to defenses available for defendant in FDIC malpractice action because
"[n]o statutory justification or public policy exists to treat the FDIC differently"); FDIC v.
Jenkins, 888 F.2d 1537, 1544-46 (11th Cir. 1989) (applying federal law, but refusing to "fash-
ion[ ] a federal common law absolute priority rule" for FDIC claims); FSLIC v. Capozzi, 855
F.2d 1319, 1325-26 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying state law to liability of S&L directors), vacated on
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eral common-law rule in place of state law is subject to a three-part bal-
ancing test: (1) Whether, in the absence of direction from Congress, the
question requires a "nationally uniform body of law"; (2) whether use of
state law would obstruct "specific objectives of ... federal programs";
and (3) whether and to what extent a different federal law would "disrupt
commercial relationships [based] on state law."
'5 3
In FDIC professional negligence suits, courts generally have applied
state law to define the elements of negligence54 and comparative or con-
tributory negligence. 5 The courts generally have applied federal com-
mon law to determine the validity of the insider fraud defense. 6
3. Bases for the insider fraud defense
In defending against a claim that a lawyer or accountant failed to
discover and inform the S&L's management of its own fraud, the profes-
sional may assert several state-law defenses. The professional defendant
may argue that the S&L was engaged in fraud and "a participant in a
fraud cannot also be a victim entitled to recover damages." 57 Alterna-
tively, the professional may argue the related doctrines of in pari delicto58
or contributory or comparative negligence.5 9 Lastly, the defendants may
other grounds, 490 U.S. 1062 (1989); cf. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (requiring
federal courts to apply state substantive law in diversity cases). Although FDIC suits may
implicate the policy of federalism, Erie does not apply to these cases because federal courts do
not rely on diversity of the parties to obtain subject matter jurisdiction over FDIC suits. The
United States Code states that, with limited exception, suits by or against the FDIC "shall be
deemed to arise under the laws of the United States," thus qualifying for federal question
subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). See 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(A)
(Supp. 111 1991).
53. United States v. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715, 728-29 (1979); accord Mardan Corp. v.
C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1458 (9th Cir. 1986); FDIC v. Main Hurdman, 655 F.
Supp. 259, 265-66 (E.D. Cal. 1987).
54. See, e.g., FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers [sic], 969 F.2d 744, 748-49 (9th Cir. 1992)
(applying California- negligence law).
55. See, e.g., FDIC v. Clark, 978 F.2d 1541, 1551-52 (10th Cir. 1992) (applying Colo-
rado's proportionate liability law); FDIC v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 742 F. Supp. 612,
614-15 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (applying Florida's contributory negligence defense).
56. See, e.g., O'Melveny, 969 F.2d at 750-51.
57. Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 454 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
880 (1982); see also Mettes v. Quinn, 411 N.E.2d 549, 551 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that
client engaged in fraud cannot recover from attorney for negligence). The court in Metres said:
Mettes would now have us allow a recovery from her attorney because his faulty
advice caused her fraud to be uncovered in such a way that she could no longer
benefit therefrom. Whether Mettes received negligent advice from Quinn is immate-
rial to our decision, for the essence of her prayer is that she be permitted to benefit
from her fraud.
Id.
58. See supra note 28.
59. See supra note 29.
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argue that they did not proximately cause the damages because even if
they had discovered the fraud, they would have been powerless to stop it
due to their duty of confidentiality.6" The success of these defenses de-
pends on the principle that the FDIC "stands in the shoes" of the failed
S&L and is, therefore, subject to the same defenses as the S&L.6
Apart from the state law defenses noted above, the viability of the
insider fraud defense depends on two federal law issues. The first ques-
tion is whether fraud by the top managers, officers, directors and control-
ling shareholders is the same as fraud by the corporation itself. The
courts frame this question as whether the corporate officers' knowledge
of their own fraud is attributed or imputed to the corporation. 62 Imput-
ing an officer's knowledge to the corporation is, in a sense, the reverse of
"piercing the corporate veil." When a court pierces the corporate veil, it
holds a shareholder liable for an obligation of the corporation.63 When a
court attributes the knowledge of an officer to the corporation, however,
it bars a claim by the corporation based on the conduct and knowledge of
its officers.6
The second question is whether the insider fraud defense is valid
against the FDIC. In some situations, the FDIC has greater rights and
powers than the S&L or a private receiver.6" If a court finds that the
FDIC is not subject to the insider fraud defense, then even if the court
were to attribute the insiders' knowledge to the corporation, the profes-
sional would still be liable to the FDIC for negligence.66
60. If the professional could not have "blown the whistle," then causation may not exist.
See infra part IV.C.4. Lack of causation was a successful defense in Ernst & Young, which
held that the accountant did not cause the loss because the S&L's chief executive officer, who
defrauded outsiders and knew the thrift's true financial condition, could not have relied on
Ernst & Young's audit to uncover fraud. FDIC v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166, 171-72 (5th
Cir. 1992).
61. See FDIC v. Glickman, 450 F.2d 416, 418 (9th Cir. 1971).
62. See, e.g., FDIC v. Clark, 978 F.2d 1541, 1550 (10th Cir. 1992); FDIC v. O'Melveny &
Meyers [sic], 969 F.2d 744, 750 (9th Cir. 1992); Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d at 170.
63. Piercing the corporate veil, also known as disregarding the corporate form, is an ex-
ception to the general rule of limited liability for shareholders. It allows a plaintiff to recover
on a corporate obligation or tort from shareholders in certain limited circumstances, including
fraud. HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 146, at 346 (3d
ed. 1983).
64. See 3 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS §§ 789-790 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1986). Although the effect is opposite, the
reason for piercing the corporate veil and imputing knowledge is the same: to achieve a just
result. See 3 id. § 787; HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 63, § 146, at 346.
65. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 461 (1942).
66. O'Melveny, 969 F.2d at 752. However, two aspects of the insider fraud defense should
apply even if the court does not impute the officer's knowledge to the corporation or the court
finds that the FDIC has greater rights than the S&L: (1) comparative negligence, and (2)
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B. Split Among the Circuits
The facts in FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers [sic], 67 which rejected the
insider fraud defense, and FDIC v. Ernst & Young,68 which accepted the
defense, were similar. Both clients-American Diversified Savings Bank
(American) and Western Savings Association (Western)-were emblem-
atic of insider fraud at S&Ls. The courts disagreed, however, on the two
principal legal issues: whether corporations should be responsible for
fraud by their dominant, controlling officers;69 and whether special fed-
eral common-law rights of the FDIC should be extended to defeat state-
law defenses.70
1. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. O'Melveny & Meyers [sic]
a American Diversified Savings Bank
American, based in Irvine, California, was one of the new breed of
S&Ls that flourished in the 1980s based on speculative investments, but
soon failed in spectacular fashion.71 When the FSLIC seized American
in 1986, it had a negative net worth of $417 million and losses grew to
$800 million by 1988.72 American had invested heavily in commercial
causation. First, in comparative and contributory negligence jurisdictions, if the top managers
are partially at fault, even if their knowledge is not attributed to the corporation, the liability of
the defendant will be proportionately reduced or eliminated. Clark, 978 F.2d at 1550, 1552
(stating that fraud of bank president was not attributed to bank, but liability of attorney de-
fendants was reduced by proportionate fault of others under Colorado law). Second, causation
is required in every tort. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 41, at 263 (5th ed. 1984). Therefore, proof that the acts of others were the sole cause
of loss, even if the court does not impute the actor's knowledge to the plaintiff, would be a
complete defense. See id
67. 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992).
68. 967 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992).
69. See supra part III.A.3; infra part IV.A.
70. See supra part III.A.3; infra part IV.B.
71. Deregulation in the 1980s allowed S&L owners to leverage money on a large scale for
real estate or other investments. See MAYER, supra note 19, at 5-6. Martin Mayer described
the regulatory and business environment that faced American:
After January 1, 1983, California law allowed an S&L to use federally insured S&L
deposits to do just about any damned thing its owners felt like doing.
... By 1983 [the] capital requirement had been dropped to only 3 percent [of
total assets]. With $3 million in "equity" from the asserted value of [the S&L
owner's] properties, [American] could own $100 million in assets, and [it] could get
the money to buy those assets very easily, simply by promising people that [it] would
pay them more for their deposits than other S&Ls would pay. The depositors ran no
risks; the federal government insured both principal and interest on every dollar de-
posited in American Diversified.
... Between June 1983 and December 1985 ... American Diversified grew from
$11.7 million to $1.1 billion. The FSLIC was on the hook for all of it.
Id
72. Id at 8.
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real estate development, which held out the possibility of big gains or, if
the investments failed, big losses.7 3
Real estate developer Ranbir Sahni, chairman of the board and chief
executive officer of American, owned ninety-six percent of the thrift's
stock; Lester Day, its president, owned the remaining four percent.74 In
separate litigation regarding American, a U.S. court of appeals panel af-
firmed a finding that Messrs. Sahni and Day were the alter egos of Amer-
ican.7' The FDIC, in yet another American-related case, sued Sahni and
Day as directors for alleged breach of fiduciary duty and Sahni for al-




In September 1985, American retained the law firm of O'Melveny &
Myers as outside counsel for an offering of real estate limited partnership
shares known as Wells Park and Gateway Center.77 O'Melveny was
largely responsible for preparing the 300-page private placement memo-
randa used to solicit outside investors to buy shares in the two real estate
syndications.78 The two deals closed December 31, 1985, and collapsed
shortly thereafter when, on February 14, 1986, the FSLIC took over
American because of its insolvency.7 9 The FDIC alleged that O'Melveny
73. American's risk-laden investment portfolio included financial futures, options, stocks
and $300 million face value of junk bonds. Id. at 6-7. American's largest investment was in
two subsidiaries that organized tax-shelter real estate partnerships, which in turn invested in
shopping centers and condominium projects. Id.
74. Appellee's Brief at x, O'Melveny (No. 90-55769).
75. California Union Ins. Co. v. American Diversified Say. Bank, 948 F.2d 556, 566 (9th
Cir. 1991). Under the alter-ego doctrine, the court disregards the corporate entity and holds
individual stockholders responsible for fraud committed using the corporation as an instru-
mentality. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 77-78. Under the sole actor doctrine,
if a shareholder is the alter ego of the corporation, the corporation may be responsible for the
shareholder's fraud. 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 292, at 797-98 (1986). See infra part IV.A.5 for
a discussion of the sole actor doctrine.
76. FSLIC v. Sahni, No. 86-1075 (C.D. Cal. filed Feb. 19, 1986). The suit, which sought
more than $60 million in damages, settled in 1990. Although the settlement amount was never
officially disclosed, due to a confidentiality agreement among the parties, an investigative re-
port stated that Salmi paid $1.15 million. See Stephen Pizzo, FDIC Let Thrift Owner Settle
with Loan Proceeds, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, Mar. 11, 1991, at 30.
77. O'Melveny, 969 F.2d at 746. A wholly-owned subsidiary of American served as gen-
eral partner of Wells Park and Gateway Center. Appellants' Opening Brief at 9, O'Melveny
(No. 90-55769). The subsidiary acquired property using loans from American and sold limited
partnership shares in the property to outside investors. Id. American anticipated profit from
the deals through interest on the loans and fees and commissions for management, brokerage
and other services. Ia
78. O'Melveny, 969 F.2d at 746.
79. Id. at 747.
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negligently failed to confirm the accuracy and completeness of the pri-
vate placement memoranda. 80
In the course of its work, O'Melveny failed to contact American's
two former accounting firms,81 its current accountants, other outside
counsel for American, or state and federal thrift regulators.82 The FDIC
contended that O'Melveny should have gone to these sources, which had
information that American was in financial and regulatory trouble and
probably insolvent.83 After taking over the institution, the FSLIC as
conservator84 decided to repay the investors because the agency deter-
mined that the private placement memoranda were misleading for failing
to disclose American's weak financial condition.85 On May 12, 1989, the
FDIC filed suit against O'Melveny for professional negligence, negligent
misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty.86 The FDIC filed two
types of claims. First, as receiver, it sued on behalf of American,
O'Melveny's former client.87 Second, it sued on behalf of the investors
who had assigned their claims against O'Melveny to the FSLIC in ex-
change for a refund of their investment.88
O'Melveny and the FDIC agreed that Mr. Sahni, Mr. Day and Wyn
Pope, executive vice president of the thrift, fraudulently overvalued
American's assets, engaged in the sham sale of assets to reap illusory
profits and generally "'cook[ed] the books.' "89O'Melveny moved for
summary judgment on the grounds, among others, that: (1) It owed no
80. Id. at 745-46.
81. Id at 747. American had terminated Touche, Ross & Co. ostensibly for being too
expensive and replaced Arthur Young & Co. after it "express[ed] concerns about [American's]
financial condition." Id at 746.
82. Id at 747.
83. Appellants' Opening Brief at 13-17, O'Melveny (No. 90-55769).
84. Conservators have the same powers as receivers, but regulators use conservatorship
when the bank or thrift has a prospect of reopening. See COBB, supra note 16, § 8.03. Receiv-
ers often replace conservators, as was the case at American. See id
85. Appellants' Opening Brief at 11, O'Melveny (No. 90-55769).
86. O'Melveny, 969 F.2d at 747.
87. Appellants' Opening Brief at 1, O'Melveny (No. 90-55769).
88. Id. The court in O'Melveny applied the same analysis to both the third-party investor
claims and the client's malpractice claims. "Given a broad duty to protect the client, this
distinction [between duty to client and duty to investors] is a false one. Part and parcel of
effectively protecting a client.., is to protect the client from the liability.., from.., a false or
misleading offering to investors." O'Melveny, 969 F.2d at 749. Whatever distinction there
may be between the two types of claims, the Ninth Circuit focused on the claims of the FDIC
as receiver. See id O'Melveny's liability to the investors, who were not clients, is beyond the
scope of this Comment. For a discussion of auditor liability to third parties, see Scott Vick,
Note, Bily v. Arthur Young & Co- Is Limiting Auditor Liability to Third Parties Favoritism or
Fair Play?, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. - (1993).
89. O'Melveny, 969 F.2d at 746 (alteration in original) (quoting parties' stipulation). The
FDIC and O'Melveny stipulated to the facts for O'Melveny's summary judgment motion. Id
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duty to American to "ferret out [American's] own fraud";9' (2) the con-
duct of wrongdoing officers must be imputed to American; 91 and (3) as a
receiver, the FDIC has no greater rights than American had.92 The U.S.
district court granted O'Melveny's summary judgment motion.93
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding
that: (1) O'Melveny owed a duty of care to American; 94 (2) estoppel did
not bar the FDIC's claims because the wrongdoing insiders at American
acted adversely to the corporation;" and (3) even if the court imputed
insider fraud to the corporation, O'Melveny could not assert the insider
fraud defense against the FDIC based on the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine
and public policy.96
a the Ninth Circuit on imputing corporate officers'
wrongdoing to the corporation
The court of appeals in O'Melveny did not impute Messrs. Sahni's
and Day's knowledge of their wrongdoing to American because
"'knowledge acquired by the agent who is acting adversely to his princi-
pal will not be attributed to the principal.' ",9 The court determined
whether the agents' actions were adverse to the corporation based on
whether the insiders or the corporation benefitted from the fraud.98 The
court decided that "disaster, not benefit, accrued to [American] through
90. Id at 747.
91. Id
92. Id
93. Id The district court did not issue a written opinion providing the basis for its deci-
sion. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 8, O'Melveny (No. 90-55769).
94. O'Melveny, 969 F.2d at 748-49. The court of appeals applied state law to the negli-
gence issue, as have other courts in deciding FDIC professional liability claims. See, eg.,
FDIC v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying Texas law). Under
California law, an attorney owes a duty to "'protect his client in every possible way.'"
O'Melveny, 969 F.2d at 748 (quoting Day v. Rosenthal, 170 Cal. App. 3d 1125, 1143, 217 Cal.
Rptr. 89, 99 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986)). The standard of care is defined as
using" 'such skill, prudence and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly
possess."' Id (quoting Day v. Rosenthal, 170 Cal. App. 3d 1125, 1143, 217 Cal. Rptr. 89, 99
(1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986)). "No California cases advise us of an exception to
the general rule that a lawyer has to act competently to avoid public harm when he learns that
his is a dishonest client." Id
95. Id. at 749-51.
96. See id at 752.
97. Id at 750 (quoting Meyer v. Glenmoor Homes, Inc., 246 Cal. App. 2d 242, 264, 54
Cal. Rptr. 786, 800-01 (1967)). The decision also cited In re Investors Funding Corp., 523 F.
Supp. 533, 540-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982) and Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983), which are discussed infra in part IV.A.3.
98. O'Melveny, 969 F.2d at 750.
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the malfeasance of Sahni, Day and Pope," and therefore concluded that
the three officers were acting adversely to the corporation.99 The court
noted that "conduct aggravating a corporation's insolvency and fraudu-
lently prolonging its life does not benefit that corporation.""1°°
Finally, the court applied an alternative analysis modeled after one
of the tests used in Schacht v. Brown, 10 Bloor v. Dansker (In re Investors
Funding Corp.)1 2 and Cenco Inc v. Seidman & Seidman.103 The Ninth
Circuit, citing these cases, said it would not impute an officer's knowl-
edge to the corporation if "a recovery by the plaintiff would serve the
objectives of tort liability by properly compensating the victims of
wrongdoing and deterring future wrongdoing.""
The Ninth Circuit noted that whether a corporation is closely held
did not affect its analysis. "'It is fundamental, of course, that a "corpo-
ration is a distinct legal entity separate from its stockholders and from its
officers."' This rule applies even when, as here, a single individual owns
nearly all of the corporation's stock." 105
d. the Ninth Circuit on special protection and powers for the
FDIC as receiver
The U.S. court of appeals in O'Melveny held that even if it attrib-
uted Messrs. Sahni's and Day's misdeeds to American, the FDIC would
not, like a normal receiver, be barred from prosecuting a malpractice
action.10 6 The court stated that under California law " '[a] receiver occu-
pies no better position than that which was occupied by the... party for
whom he acts.., and any defense good against the original party is good
99. IdL
100. Id (citing Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), "cerL denied, 464 U.S. 1002
(1983); In re Investors Funding Corp., 523 F. Supp. 533, 540-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
101. 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983).
102. 523 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). This Comment cites Bloor as In re Investors Fund-
ing Corp. to be consistent with the other cases discussed in the Comment.
103. 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
104. O'Melveny, 969 F.2d at 750-51 (citing Diamond Mortgage Corp. v. Sugar, 913 F.2d
1233, 1247-48 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying Investors Funding to legal malpractice claims of cor-
porations in bankruptcy), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 968 (1991); Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d
1343, 1348 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983); Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman,
686 F.2d 449, 455 (7th Cir. 1982)).
The O'Melveny court noted that the Ninth Circuit relied on the holding of Schacht to
decide Kempe v. Monitor Intermediaries, Inc., 785 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1986). Kempe con-
cerned a liquidator's suit to recover losses caused by a conspiracy of company insiders and
outsiders. Id at 1444.
105. O'Melveny, 969 F.2d at 750 (citations omitted) (quoting Merco Constr. Eng'rs v. Mu-
nicipal Court, 21 Cal. 2d 724, 729, 581 P.2d 636, 639, 147 Cal. Rptr. 631, 634 (1978)).
106. Id at 752.
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against the receiver.' "107 However, based on the doctrine established in
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, the court held that federal, not state,
law governed the application of defenses against the FDIC.'
The court said it was guided by the equitable maxim that a court
may "'look through the form of the transaction, and adjust the equities
of the parties with a view to its substance.' "I" Distinguishing the FDIC
from a "normal successor in interest," the court noted that the FDIC
has no choice in the matter-"it is thrust into [the failed thrift's]
shoes."110 The court balanced the FDIC's interest in the "regulatory
scheme designed to protect the interests of third parties who.., were not
privy to the bank's inequitable conduct""' against O'Melveny's interest
as "a party asserting an equitable defense.""' 2
Allowing the defense, the court said, would "diminish[ ] the value of
the asset pool held by the receiver and limit[ ] the receiver's discretion in
disposing of the assets." '113 Since this would frustrate the FDIC's regula-
tory goals, the court concluded that "equitable defenses [valid] against
the bank should not be available against the receiver." ' 4
2. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Ernst & Young
a. Western Savings Association
Dallas-based Western was, like American, a closely held corpora-
tion. Jarret E. Woods, Jr. purchased 100% of Western's stock on Au-
gust 30, 1982, and appointed himself chairman of the board and chief
executive officer."' The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed a finding that "Woods effectively dominated and controlled
Western."
1 16
Mr. Woods transformed a sleepy S&L into one that "engag[ed] in
complex commercial ventures and risky loans.""' 7 Western became a
link in a "daisy chain" of Texas thrifts that financed "land flips," in
107. Id. at 751 (alteration in original) (quoting Allen v. Ramsay, 179 Cal. App. 2d 843, 854,
4 Cal. Rptr. 575, 583 (1960)).
108. Id. (citing D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 456 (1942)).
109. Id. (quoting Drexel v. Berney, 122 U.S. 241, 254 (1887)).
110. Id.




115. FDIC v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1992).
116. Id.
117. FDIC v. Ernst & Young, No. 3-90-0490-H, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13955, at *2 (N.D.
Tex. Sept. 29, 1991) (mem.), aff'd, 967 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992).
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which the same property would trade hands at rapidly rising prices until
"the final outside borrower, dazzled by what appeared to be rapidly esca-
lating value of the land, would be left holding the loan-and along with
it, a property that was actually worth far less than its appraised
value." '118 After the fall of Western, the U.S. Department of Justice in-
dicted Mr. Woods, and the FDIC filed a civil action against him in his
capacity as an officer and director of Western. 19
b. the facts
Before the thrift collapsed, Mr. Woods's strategy appeared wildly
successful. Western hired as auditors Arthur Young & Co., who certified
a net worth for the thrift of more than $41 million in 1984 and $49 mil-
lion in 1985.120 Western's seeming financial strength, however, stemmed
from "paper profits." According to the FDIC, "Woods made false en-
tries in Western's books with intent to deceive Western's board and gov-
ernment regulators, and he conspired to misapply Western's funds....
[T]hese policies were part of a scheme by Woods to defraud Western's
depositors and creditors." ' Re-examination of Western's books after
federal regulators shut it down showed the thrift had a negative net
worth of more than $100 million in 1984 and $200 million in 1985.122
Total losses at the thrift were $560 million by the time the FSLIC
stepped in as receiver on September 12, 1986.123
The FDIC on March 1, 1990, sued Ernst & Young" 4 for negligence
and breach of contract for failing to uncover the losses during its annual
audits. 2 The FDIC alleged that if the thrift's board of directors had
accurate financial information showing losses rather than profits, it
would have "stopped making the high risk loans that caused the $560
million in losses." 126 Ernst & Young argued that Mr. Woods, as sole
118. PILZER & DErrz, supra note 19, at 93. For example, one daisy chain started with the
purchase of 2175 acres of raw land 20 miles from Fort Worth, Texas, for $17.25 million on
October 28, 1983. Id at 93-94. The property remained unimproved, but changed hands over
the following two years at successive sales prices of $24 million, $44.7 million, $37.4 million
(after some of the original land was sold separately) and $64.4 million. Id. at 94-95. Western
financed the final sale at $85.5 million. Id at 95. When federal regulators closed Western in
September 1986, the land was reappraised at $21 million. Id
119. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d at 169 n.1.
120. Id at 168.
121. Id
122. Id
123. Id at 168-69.
124. Ernst & Young is the successor partnership to Arthur Young & Co. Id. at 169.
125. Id
126. FDIC v. Ernst & Young, No. 3-90-0490-H, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13955, at *3 (N.D.
Tex. Sept. 29, 1991) (mem.), aff'd, 967 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992).
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stockholder, chairman of the board and chief executive officer, knew the
true state of Western's financial condition, and therefore Western could
not have relied on the false audits. 127 The district court granted sum-
mary judgment to Ernst & Young on the negligence claim.128 The court
of appeals affirmed, stating that "'[i]f nobody relied upon the audit, then
the audit could not have been a 'substantial factor in bringing about the
injury,' ,,129 and therefore causation did not exist.
c. the Fifth Circuit on imputing corporate officers' wrongdoing to the
corporation
The U.S. court of appeals in Ernst & Young concluded that Texas
had adopted the majority rule that "a bank officer or director's knowl-
edge [is imputed] to the bank unless the officer or director acts with an
interest adverse to the bank." 130 Under Texas law, the test to determine
whether an officer's fraud is adverse to the corporation is whether it is
"' "[f]raud on behalf of a corporation"'" or "' "fraud against it." ' 131
The Fifth Circuit concluded that Mr. Woods served both his own inter-
ests and the corporation's through his fraud. 132 "Woods acted on the
corporation's behalf because by serving Western, he served himself ....
As the sole owner, Woods' fraudulent activities on Western's behalf
benefitted himself and injured outsiders to Western-i.e. depositors and
creditors."133 Therefore, the court of appeals imputed Mr. Woods's
knowledge to Western.
1 34
In addition to agency law, the court applied a "common sense"
analysis to the imputed-knowledge issue based on: (1) the policy of de-
terring and punishing corporate fraud, and (2) the identity of interests
between a corporation and its sole owner. 13  Noting Mr. Woods's com-
plete ownership and control of Western, the court of appeals stated:
127. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d at 170.
128. Id at 168. The district court dismissed the breach of contract count for failing to state
a claim. Id
129. Id at 170 (quoting McClure v. Allied Stores, 608 S.W.2d 901, 903 (rex. 1980)).
130. Idk (citing FDIC v. Lott, 460 F.2d 82, 88 (5th Cir. 1972)).
131. Id at 171 (quoting Greenstein, Logan & Co. v. Burgess Mktg., Inc., 744 S.W.2d 170,
190-91 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982))). See infra part IV.A.3.c for a discussion of
Cenco.
132. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d at 171.
133. Id
134. Id
135. Id This analysis is similar to the holding in J.. McCaskill Co. v. United States, 216
U.S. 504, 515 (1910). See infra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
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"Because a corporation operates through individuals, the
privity and knowledge of individuals at a certain level of re-
sponsibility must be deemed the privity and knowledge of the
organization, 'else it could always limit its liability.'... Where
the level of responsibility begins must be discerned from the
circumstances of each case." In the present case, the level of
responsibility must extend at least to the sole owner who domi-
nated the board of directors.136
Having disposed of the imputed-knowledge issue in favor of Ernst &
Young, the court considered whether the insider fraud defense was valid
against the FDIC.
d. the Fifth Circuit on special protection and powers for the FDIC as
receiver
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the FDIC as receiver
was an ordinary assignee and treated the case as the functional equivalent
of a "case in which a client is suing its auditor." '137 The FDIC as receiver
"'obtains only the right, title, and interest of his assignor at the time of
his assignment, and no more. Accordingly, an assignee may recover only
those damages potentially available to his assignor.' ""3
The court noted that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine bars borrowers
from asserting defenses against the FDIC based on secret side con-
tracts 39 and that federal policy dictates that the FDIC in some cases has
greater rights than the failed bank."4 However, the court declined to
extend federal common law to defenses available against the FDIC when
it brings tort claims belonging to a failed institution. 4 '
The Fifth Circuit relied on FDIC v. Chery, Bekaert & Holland 42
and other cases '43 that declined to extend the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine
beyond its "'limited... scope'" to defenses available to bank auditors
136. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d at 171 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Conti-
nental Oil Co. v. Bonanza Corp., 706 F.2d 1365, 1376 (5th Cir. 1983)).
137. Id at 169.
138. Id (quoting State Fidelity Mortgage Co. v. Varner, 740 S.W.2d 477, 480 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1987)).
139. Id (citing Campbell Leasing, Inc. v. FDIC, 901 F.2d 1244, 1248 (5th Cir. 1990)).
140. Id (citing In re Jeter, 48 B.R. 404, 410 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985)).
141. Id at 170.
142. 742 F. Supp. 612 (M.D. Fla. 1990). See infra part IV.B.5 for a discussion of Cherry,
Bekaert.
143. FDIC v. Jenkins, 888 F.2d 1537, 1545-46 (11th Cir. 1989); FDIC v. Harrison, 735
F.2d 408, 412 (1 1th Cir. 1984). See infra text accompanying notes 306-10 for a discussion of
Jenkins.
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sued by the FDIC for negligence. 44 The court echoed Cherry, Bekaert's
judicial-restraint rationale in concluding that the FDIC is not entitled to
special protection when it brings a tort claim against a third party on
behalf of a failed bank.'45 "No statutory justification or public policy
exists to treat the FDIC differently from other assignees .... 46 On
both principal issues, imputed knowledge and the rights of the FDIC,
Ernst & Young was a victory for the insider fraud defense.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Imputing the Wrongdoing of a Corporate Officer to the Corporation
Two independent legal theories support application of the insider
fraud defense to the facts of FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers [sic]. First,
based on the analysis used in Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 47 the
interests of Messrs. Sahni and Day were not adverse to American, so the
court should have attributed their acts and knowledge to the corporation.
Second, even if their interests were adverse, Messrs. Sahni and Day dom-
inated and controlled American, so the court should have attributed
their acts and knowledge to the corporation based on the sole actor
doctrine.1
48
1. Knowledge of the agent is presumed knowledge of the principal
Under general principles of corporations law, the corporate entity is
distinct from its shareholders, directors, officers and employees.' 49 A
corporation is a legal "person" that makes contracts, buys, owns and
sells property, and carries on its business through designated agents. 5 '
The law of agency, in this regard, is applicable to the law of corpora-
tions. 5 Under agency law, the principal is bound by the knowledge ac-
quired by an agent in the course of his or her agency.' 52 The rationale
for the rule is that corporate officers have a duty to inform their employ-
144. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d at 169-70 (quoting FDIC v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 742
F. Supp. 612, 614-15 (M.D. Fla. 1990)).
145. Id. at 170.
146. Id. The court said: "The most significant factor in the present case's outcome is the
FDIC's decision to sue only as Western's assignee. The FDIC did not sue on its own behalf or
on Western's creditors' behalf." I. at 169. The court suggested that "[e]ither Western's cred-
itors or the FDIC on its own behalf may have a cause of action against [Ernst & Young]." Id.
at 171-72.
147. 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
148. See infra part IV.A.5.
149. 1 FLETCHER, supra note 64, § 25 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990).
150. 1 id § 30.
151. 1 id
152. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF AGENCY § 272 (1957).
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ers and to take appropriate actions based on knowledge relating to their
official functions."5 3
The rule of imputed knowledge finds frequent application in bank
and S&L cases.154 Thus, knowledge acquired by a bank officer while act-
ing in an official capacity is imputed to the corporation.
1 55
2. The adverse interest exception
An exception to the rule is that an agent's knowledge is not imputed
to the principal if the agent acted adversely to the principal. 156 The re-
quirements of the adverse interest exception are: (1) The agent acts for
his or her own benefit, and (2) the agent acts against the interest of the
principal.15 7 The rationale for the adverse interest exception is that the
agent's self-interest makes it less likely that the agent would fully inform
the principal." For example, if a cashier's purpose is to defraud a bank,
a court will not impute the cashier's knowledge to the bank.159 Courts
reach the same result if a cashier embezzles funds deposited at the
bank.16
Fraud by the agent does not necessarily make the agent's interest
adverse to the corporation. The cases distinguish between an agent's
153. United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (Ist Cir. 1987).
154. 3 FLETCHER, supra note 64, §§ 806, 806.1.
155. American Nat'l Bank v. Miller, 229 U.S. 517, 521-22 (1913); FDIC v. Clark, 978 F.2d
1541, 1550 (10th Cir. 1992); City Natl Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 231 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); City of Phila. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830,
830 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Austin v. Hallmark Oil Co., 21 Cal. 2d 718, 729, 134 P.2d 777, 784
(1943); 10 AM. JUR. 2D Banks, supra note 45, §§ 163, 167; 3 FLETCHER, supra note 64,
§§ 789-790.
156. American Nat'l Bank, 229 U.S. at 521-22; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY,
supra note 152, § 282.
157. 3 FLETCHER, supra note 64, §§ 819-820. One test to determine if an agent's interest is
adverse to the principal is whether, in the circumstances of the case, the agent's interest is so
incompatible with the principal's interest as to render it reasonably unlikely that the agent
would act on behalf of the principal or disclose relevant knowledge to the principal. Interna-
tional Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567, 580 (Tex. 1963); Goldstein v. Union
Nat'1 Bank, 213 S.W. 584, 590-91 (Tex. 1919); 3 FLETCHER, supra note 64, § 821.
158. SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1310 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that agent's
knowledge is not imputed to corporation if agent participated in fraud against corporation);
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Tulsa Indus. Loan & Inv. Co., 83 F.2d 14, 16 (10th Cir. 1936) ("[I]t
is ... essential to the existence of... a fraud that the agent conceal the facts and consequently
the ordinary presumption that he will communicate to his principal all facts concerning the
business does not arise.").
159. Hadden v. Dooley, 92 F. 274, 278-79 (2d Cir. 1899).
160. Matz v. Ibach, 291 N.W. 377, 380 (Wis. 1940) (holding that presumption that cashier
communicated knowledge to bank is rebutted if cashier's adverse role in transaction would
induce cashier to withhold information).
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fraud against the corporation (such as embezzlement)16 1 and an agent's
fraud on behalf of the corporation.1 62 An agent's independent fraudulent
acts solely for his or her own benefit are examples of the former, and
knowledge of the fraud is not imputed to the corporation.1 63 The agent's
interest in the action is personal and does not benefit the corporation.
164
Fraud on behalf of the corporation, such as theft from creditors,
depositors or others outside the corporation, may benefit the corporation
and does not create an adverse interest.1 65 If a corporation benefits from
an agent's conduct, it may not retain the benefit while disclaiming knowl-
edge of the fraud. 6 6 For example, a cashier who stole from a depositor's
account to increase the banl's capital was deemed to have acted on be-
half of the bank. 167 The court imputed the bank's receiver with knowl-
edge of the embezzlement.
1 61
Based on similar concerns of corporate fraud, another court held
that the adverse interest exception applies only if a third person seeks to
enforce some demand against the corporation, but has no application if a
corporation seeks to enforce the benefit of a fraud perpetrated by its of-
ficer on a third person.1 69 Otherwise, the adverse interest exception to
the rule of imputed knowledge would be "a vehicle for the consumma-
tion of fraud.""17
161. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. People's Bank, 72 F.2d 932, 937 (4th Cir.) (stating that
embezzler's knowledge is not imputed to bank), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 627 (1934); 3
FLETCHER, supra note 64, § 826.
162. Schneider v. Thompson, 58 F.2d 94, 97 (8th Cir. 1932).
163. American Sur. Co. v. Pauly, 170 U.S. 133, 158-59 (1898); 3 FLETCHER, supra note 64,
§ 826.
164. American Sur. Co., 170 U.S. at 159; 3 FLETCHER, supra note 64, § 826.
165. 3 FLETCHER, supra note 64, § 826.
166. Curtis, Collins & Holbrook Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 215, 224 (1923) ("[I]f the
Company insists on retaining the fruits of that adventure, it must be charged with the knowl-
edge of the agent through whom the fruits came."); 3 FLETCHER, supra note 64, § 830.
167. Schneider, 58 F.2d at 97.
168. Id In addition to the benefit to the bank, the court imputed the cashier's knowledge
to the bank because the cashier was in practice the sole manager of the bank. Id. Thus, both
the sole actor doctrine, see infra part IV.A.5, and the rule for fraud on behalf of a corporation
support the holding.
169. Gordon v. Continental Casualty Co., 181 A. 574, 576 (Pa. 1935). The case of a thrift
or its receiver suing a professional for malpractice, when the negligence consists of failing to
uncover the fraud of an officer, is analogous to seeking to benefit from the officer's fraud. Cf
i d
170. Id In Gordon, the plaintiff argued that the bank's chief executive, who had embezzled
$26,000, was acting adversely to the bank when he later obtained a bond to indemnify the bank
against loss due to the dishonesty of its officers and employees. Id. The court held: "In
procuring the bond, Matthews was not acting adversely to the bank, but in its behalf. The
adverse act of embezzling the money had been consummated previously." Id. Absent an
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Determining whether an agent's fraud makes him or her adverse to
the corporation is central to a court's decision on whether to attribute the
agent's knowledge to the corporation. However, recent cases on the ad-
verse interest exception, including FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers [sic]17'
and FDIC v. Ernst & Young, 72 have applied conflicting analyses.' 73
3. Two approaches to the adverse interest exception
The O'Melveny and Ernst & Young decisions relied largely on three
cases in deciding when insider fraud makes the officers' interest adverse:
In re Investors Funding Corp., 7 Schacht v. Brown' and Cenco Inc v.
Seidman & Seidman.176 All three cases involved receivers' suits against
outside accountants, 177 but the decisions reveal two different approaches.
In Investors Funding and Schacht, the key factor in determining that
the agents' interests were adverse was that the companies ended up in
bankruptcy. 171 In Cenco, the key factor was not the end result but
whether the fraud was directed at stockholders or outsiders. 179 Only in
Cenco did the defendant prevail based on an insider fraud defense.' 8 '
a. In re Investors Funding Corp.
In re Investors Funding Corp. 181 concerned three corporate officers
who allegedly bankrupted Investors Funding through insider misappro-
priation of funds and secret, sham transactions designed to conceal
losses.'8 2 The bankruptcy trustee sued the outside auditor for breach of
contract and malpractice for failing to uncover the fraud. 183 The auditor
adverse interest, the bank was deemed to have notice of the chief executive's dishonesty and
was not entitled to collect on the bond. Id at 576, 579.
171. 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992).
172. 967 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992).
173. Compare Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir.) (concluding
that fraudulent employees' interests were not adverse), cerL denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982) with
Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1347-48 (7th Cir.) (concluding that fraudulent employees'
interests were adverse), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983).
174. 523 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
175. 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983).
176. 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
177. See Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1345; Cenco, 686 F.2d at 440; Investors Funding, 523 F.
Supp. at 537.
178. See Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1347-48; Investors Funding, 523 F. Supp. at 541.
179. See Cenco, 686 F.2d at 456.
180. See id.
181. 523 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
182. Id at 536. Jerome, Norman and Raphael Dansker were "the principal officers, con-
trolling directors, controlling stockholders and the dominant force of [Investors Funding]."
Id.
183. Id at 537.
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argued that the court should impute the insiders' knowledge to the cor-
poration and its bankruptcy trustee."' The auditor defendants con-
tended that the officers' interests were not adverse to the corporation
because the fraud benefitted Investors Funding by obtaining capital that
staved off bankruptcy. 85
The Investors Funding court held that fraudulently extending the
life of the corporation only benefitted the officers, not the corporation.
186
The court believed the end result-bankruptcy-retroactively showed
that the agents served their personal interests to the detriment of the
principal.
187
According to the Investors Funding analysis, therefore, the key fac-
tor is the end result. If the corporation is bankrupted, then the agent's
fraud is adverse to the principal. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
applied the same analysis in Schacht v. Brown.1 8
b. Schacht v. Brown
In Schacht, the Illinois State Director of Insurance sued, among
others, the directors and three outside auditors of Reserve Insurance Co.
(Reserve) for arranging and concealing fraudulent transactions designed
to hide the insolvency of the company.1 89 By issuing high-risk policies
and maintaining inadequate capital, Reserve accrued a $100 million defi-
cit as of the time the State placed it in receivership.1 90 The State alleged
that the outside accounting firms "knew of Reserve's insolvency" and the
concealment from regulators, but nonetheless issued audits showing a
positive net worth.191
The accountant defendants argued that because the officers and di-
rectors controlled the fraud, the insiders' knowledge estopped both
Reserve and its liquidator from recovering damages from the account-
ants.192 The Schacht court found that Reserve's officers and directors
184. Id at 540.
185. Id at 541.
186. Id
187. See id
188. 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983).
189. Id at 1345.
190. Id
191. Id The State further alleged that "the accounting firm defendants joined with...
Reserve's officers and directors in a multifaceted, fraudulent scheme which kept Reserve oper-
ating long past insolvency in a manner which resulted in enormous losses to the... company."
Id at 1345-46.
192. Id at 1346. Some of the accountants argued, in the alternative, that even if estoppel
did not apply, the plaintiff could not prove the causation element of fraud because the corpora-
tion knew of the insolvency through its officers and directors. Id. at 1346 n.2. The court
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harmed the company by fraudulently extending its life, stripping away its
assets and income and running up larger deficits.' 93 The court of appeals
stated: "[T]he prolonged artificial insolvency of Reserve benefitted only
Reserve's managers and the other alleged conspirators, not the
corporation."'
194
In Schacht, as in In re Investors Funding Corp.,'" the key factor in
determining whether the agents' interests were adverse was whether the
fraud ultimately hurt the corporation. The court of appeals applied a
very different analysis in Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman. 96
c. Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman
In Cenco, rather than focusing on the final result, the court asked
whether the agent's fraud was against the corporation or on behalf of the
corporation.' 97 Under the Cenco analysis, the fraud's ultimate effect on
the corporation is unimportant. 98 The Cenco approach often yields a
different result from the analysis applied in Schacht and Investors
Funding.
At Cenco, the chairman, president, other top managers and two of
the nine members of the board of directors-none of whom were major-
ity shareholders-fraudulently inflated the company's inventory. 199
Shareholders filed a class action/derivative suit against the corrupt man-
agers and the outside auditors who failed to uncover the fraud." ° The
auditors, Seidman & Seidman, settled with the shareholders for $3.5 mil-
lion, but went to trial on the claims asserted by the corporation, which
was under new management.2 10
Considering whether to impute the insiders' fraud to the corpora-
tion, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that auditors must be
vigilant against fraud, but
this does not tell us what the result should be if the fraud per-
meates the top management of the company and if, moreover,
treated the causation and estoppel arguments as raising the same issue. Id. In FDIC v. Ernst
& Young, 967 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992), the accountants prevailed using the same causation
argument. Id. at 170.
193. Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1347-48.
194. Id
195. 523 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
196. 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
197. Id. at 456.
198. See id.
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the managers are not stealing from the company-that is, from
its current stockholders-but instead are turning the company
into an engine of theft against outsiders--creditors, prospective
stockholders, insurers, etc.2"2
Judge Richard Posner, writing for the court of appeals, concluded
that the fraud by Cenco's employees and officers was fraud "for the bene-
fit of the company, not against it," and therefore the court attributed it to
the corporation.20 3 Distinguishing between fraud on behalf of the corpo-
ration and fraud against it, Judge Posner explained that fraud against the
corporation usually hurts just the corporation and its stockholders. 2°
Conversely, he continued, "stockholders of a corporation whose officers
commit fraud for the benefit of the corporation are beneficiaries of the
fraud."205
The insider abuse did not bankrupt Cenco, as it did Investors Fund-
ing. Under Judge Posner's analysis, however, a resulting bankruptcy
would not necessarily transform outward-directed fraud on behalf of the
corporation into inward-directed fraud. Fraud on behalf of the corpora-
tion is not limited to cases in which the corporation is a "net
beneficiar[y]. ' 20 6 In some cases, the corporation may be a net loser after
the fraud is uncovered, "[b]ut the primary costs of a fraud on the corpo-
ration's behalf are borne not by the stockholders but by outsiders to the
corporation, and the stockholders should not be allowed to escape all
responsibility for such a fraud.,
207
Judge Posner's decision to impute knowledge of the fraud to
Cenco allowed the accountants a defense because, under Illinois
law, a participant in a fraud cannot also be a victim of the fraud
entitled to recover damages.208 The court of appeals placed great
202. Id. at 454.





208. Id at 454. This defense recognizes that a victim-participant does not rely on the
fraudulent representations and therefore the fraud does not cause the injury. See id.
Judge Posner also performed an intricate balancing based on the "underlying objectives of
tort liability," which are "to compensate victims of wrongdoing and to deter future wrongdo-
ing." Id at 455. He concluded that the accountants should not be held liable to the corpora-
tion because: (1) The accountants had already compensated the injured shareholders through
the earlier class-action settlement; (2) the wrongdoing officers who were still shareholders of
Cenco would benefit pro rata from Cenco's recovery against the auditors; and (3) deterrence
would be best accomplished by giving shareholders an incentive to ensure the honesty of man-
agement. Id at 455-56.
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weight on the fact that "fraud permeat[ed] the top management of
Cenco." 209
4. The Cenco analysis requires corporate responsibility
The Cenco analysis makes corporations responsible for their officers'
frauds. The Cenco court recognized that when an individual commits
fraud using a corporation as the tool, both the individual and the corpo-
ration may "gain," at least in the short term.21 0 On the other hand,
when an individual steals corporate assets, only the individual benefits,
and the personal gain is at the corporation's expense.211 Cenco estab-
lished a clear-cut test for distinguishing the two situations: whether
stockholders or outsiders bear the brunt of the fraud.212 The net gain or
loss of the company is not a factor because even outward-directed
fraud-when outsiders bear the brunt of the loss-may result in insol-
vency after the fraud is uncovered or runs its course.21 3
The alternative test, found in In re Investors Funding Colp. ,214 dif-
fers in that the analysis focuses on the end result. The court in Investors
Funding concluded that fraudulently obtaining capital to prolong the life
of a corporation does not benefit the corporation.215 The fault with this
holding, and the same conclusion in Schacht v. Brown, 2 16 is that it as-
sumes fraud can benefit either the officers or the corporation, but not
both.
In FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers [sic], 217 the Ninth Circuit stated it
was following Cenco, Schacht, and Investors Funding, but it failed to dis-
tinguish the two different approaches.21 8 The O'Melveny court seemed to
adopt the Schacht and Investors Funding approach, stating: "Here, dis-
aster, not benefit, accrued to [American] through the malfeasance of [the
insiders].1 21 9 A court applying this superficial analysis could never im-
209. Id at 456.
210. See id.
211. See id at 454-55.
212. See id at 456.
213. See id.
214. 523 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
215. Id at 541 ("[I]t is manifest that the prolonged artificial solvency of [Investors Fund-
ing] benefitted only the Danskers and their confederates, not [Investors Funding].").
216. 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983). Schacht adopted the
Investors Funding test. "[T]he prolonged artificial insolvency of Reserve benefitted only Re-
serve's managers and the other alleged conspirators, not the corporation." Id. at 1347-48.
217. 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992).
218. See id at 750.
219. Id
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pute the knowledge of fraudulent top officers to the corporation if the
corporation ultimately suffered a loss.
If the Ninth Circuit had applied the Cenco test to the facts of
O'Melveny in a manner consistent with Judge Posner's opinion, the court
would have considered who gained and who lost due to Messrs. Sahni's
and Day's fraud.220 The two stockholders lost an investment of a few
million dollars. 21 Creditors, depositors and ultimately the S&L insur-
ance fund lost $800 million.22 This was outward-directed fraud. In
Ernst & Young, the Fifth Circuit correctly applied the Cenco test to facts
similar to those in O'Melveny and concluded that the corporation and its
sole owner gained from the fraud, while the thrift's depositors and credi-
tors lost.
223
American's two 100% owners, who held the positions of chairman,
chief executive officer and president, used the thrift as a vehicle for fraud
and concealed the fraud from outsiders.224 Yet under the decision in
O'Melveny, the corporation avoided any responsibility for the fraud.225
In concluding that the owners' interests were adverse to the corporation,
the Ninth Circuit ignored the fact that there can be no gain in stealing
from a solvent corporation when one owns all the stock. Under the
O'Melveny court's view of agency law, corrupt S&L owners such as
Messrs. Sahni and Day could benefit from their fraud by suing-in the
name of the thrift-the lawyers and accountants who failed to uncover
and stop their fraud.226
O'Melveny is one of a handful of cases that has muddied the waters
of agency law.2 27 A major area of confusion seems to be how to deter-
220. See Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 454-56 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 880 (1982).
221. Mr. Sahni purchased 100% of the stock of Tokay Savings Bank, which he renamed
American, for $2.88 million in 1983. Memorandum of Contentions of Fact and Law of Lester
G. Day et al. at 4, FSLIC v. Sahni, (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 5, 1989) (No. 86-1075).
222. MAYER, supra note 19, at 8.
223. FDIC v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 1992).
224. See O'Melveny, 969 F.2d at 746.
225. Id. at 750-51.
226. The O'Melveny court did not expressly limit its holding to FDIC receiverships. See id.
It follows, then, that if regulators had not seized American, the rule announced in O'Melveny
would apply to American in the same way it applied to the FDIC. Because Messrs. Sahni's
and Day's fraudulent conduct caused loss to American, their interests were adverse to the
corporation and therefore their knowledge is not attributed to American. Id. at 750. Ameri-
can, then, should be entitled to recover from O'Melveny for professional negligence, see id.,
even though the true beneficiaries of any recovery by American would be the wrongdoers,
Messrs. Sahni and Day, who own all the stock.
227. Compare O'Melveny, 969 F.2d at 750-51 (deciding not to impute officers' knowledge to
corporation) and Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1347-48 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1002 (1983) and In re Investors Funding Corp., 523 F. Supp. at 533, 540-41
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mine whether an agent's interest is adverse to that of the principal.228 In
Cenco, Judge Posner articulated the most logical and sensible approach
by recognizing that a corporation can be used as a vehicle for fraud.22 9
5. Sole actor doctrine
The sole actor doctrine, a limitation on the adverse interest excep-
tion, provides a second, independent grounds for attributing S&L of-
ficers' wrongdoing to the corporation. If an agent is the "sole actor" or
"sole representative" for a corporation in a transaction, the knowledge of
the agent will be imputed to the corporation even if the agent's interest is
adverse to the corporation.230 The sole actor limitation on the adverse
interest exception is based on fairness.2 3 ' When a principal acts exclu-
sively through one agent, the agent acts as the principal, thus the agent
has no need to convey information to the principal.232 The sole actor
doctrine is the majority rule in the United States.233
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (same) with Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d at 170-71 (imputing officers' knowledge
to corporation) and Cenco, 686 F.2d at 454 (same). See supra part III.B for a discussion of
O'Melveny and Ernst & Young and part IV.A.3.a-c for a discussion of Investors Funding,
Schacht and Cenco.
228. Compare Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1347-48 and Investors Funding, 523 F. Supp. at 541
(stating that delaying corporation's ultimate insolvency does not benefit corporation) with
Cenco, 686 F.2d at 454 (focusing on identity of beneficiaries and losers to determine whether
agent's interest is adverse).
The court of appeals in FDIC v. Clark, 978 F.2d 1541 (10th Cir. 1992), applied a third
approach to the adverse interest exception, although the Clark decision used different termi-
nology. In that legal malpractice case, the court did not impute the bank president's and vice
president's knowledge to the bank because the officers "were not acting within the scope of
their employment or agency with the Aurora Bank." Id. at 1550. According to the Tenth
Circuit, "acts done to accomplish an independent purpose of the employee [are] not acts
within the scope of employment." Id In the Clark case, the bank's president and vice presi-
dent were involved in a scheme to buy $9 million of stolen currency for $2 million in "clean
money." Id at 1546. The bank officers obtained the purchase price by approving fraudulent
loans and overdrafts to others involved in the scheme. Id. The bank president was ultimately
convicted and sentenced to two years in prison for criminal fraud. Id at 1549 n.5. Based on
these facts, the Cenco analysis would produce the same result because the stockholders were
directly defrauded. The bank was the victim, not the vehicle, for the fraud. The Clark case
differs factually from O'Melveny and Ernst & Young because the fraudulent officers were not
entirely in control of management. The bank's chairman of the board was not involved in the
fraud, and the bank fired the president after the scheme was uncovered. Id. at 1548.
229. Cenco, 686 F.2d at 454.
230. Curtis, Collins & Holbrook Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 215, 222 (1923) (stating that
company "is charged with Holbrcok's knowledge because he was the sole actor for the Com-
pany in procuring the fraudulent patents"); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Tulsa Indus. Loan &
Inv. Co., 83 F.2d 14, 17 (10th Cir. 1936); 3 FLETCHER, supra note 64, §§ 809, 827.
231. See 3 FLETCHER, supra note 64, § 827.1.
232. 3 id
233. Courts in 33 states have accepted the sole actor doctrine: Alabama, Tatum v. Com-
mercial Bank & Trust Co., 69 So. 508, 512-13 (Ala. 1915); Alaska, Matanuska Valley Bank v.
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The Second Circuit applied similar reasoning in Munroe v. Harri-
man,"' in which bank president Joseph Harriman of Harriman National
Bank & Trust Co. dominated the loan committee and caused it to rubber
stamp a loan to a dummy corporation he owned.2 35 The loan was se-
cured by stocks fraudulently acquired by Harriman from a third party.
23 6
The court of appeals in Munroe found that the loan committee, on Harri-
man's instructions, approved the loan after it had already been made.2 37
Deciding to impute Harriman's knowledge to the bank, the court said:
With respect to loans to Harriman ... the other officers and
employees of the bank did without question whatever he re-
quested, and the District Court found that they were com-
pletely dominated by him.... His will alone caused the making
Arnold, 223 F.2d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 1955); Arizona, Pearll v. Selective Life Ins. Co., 444 P.2d
443, 445-46 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968); Arkansas, City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221,
231 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); California, First Natl Bank v. Reed, 198 Cal.
252, 259-60, 244 P. 368, 371 (1926); Colorado, Vail Nat'l Bank v. Finkelman, 800 P.2d 1342,
1345 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990); Connecticut, First Nat'l Bank v. Town of New Milford, 36 Conn.
93, 101 (1869); Florida, Amvest Capital Corp. v. Banco Exterior de Espana, 675 F. Supp. 640,
644 (S.D. Fla. 1987); Georgia, Brunswick Nursing & Convalescent Ctr. v. Great Am. Ins. Co.,
308 F. Supp. 297, 300 (S.D. Ga. 1970); Illinois, First Nat'l Bank v. Lewco Sec. Corp., 860 F.2d
1407, 1417-18 (7th Cir. 1988); Iowa, FDIC v. National Sur. Corp., 281 N.W.2d 816, 820-21
(Iowa 1979); Kansas, Supreme Petroleum, Inc. v. Briggs, 433 P.2d 373, 378-79 (Kan. 1968);
Kentucky, Anderson v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 141 F.2d 898, 908 (6th Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 798 (1945); Massachusetts, Atlantic Cotton-Mills v. Indian Orchard Mills, 17
N.E. 496, 501 (Mass. 1888); Michigan, National Turners Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Schreit-
mueller, 285 N.W. 497, 499 (Mich. 1939); Minnesota, Sussel Co. v. First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 238 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Minn. 1976); Missouri, Newco Land Co. v. Martin, 213 S.W.2d
504, 511 (Mo. 1948); New Jersey, Mick v. Royal Exch. Assur., 91 A. 102, 105-06 (N.J. 1914);
New York, Yager Pontiac v. Fred A. Danker & Sons, 343 N.Y.S.2d 209, 212 (App. Div.
1973); North Carolina, Le Duc v. Moore, 15 S.E. 888, 889 (N.C. 1892); North Dakota, Grebe
v. Swords, 149 N.W. 126, 130 (N.D. 1914); Ohio, Politte v. Farris, No. 86 C.A. 39, 1987 WL
15353, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 6, 1987) (unpublished opinion with limited precedential
value under Ohio Supreme Court Rule 2); Oklahoma, United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Oklahoma ex reL Sebring, 383 F.2d 417, 419-20 (10th Cir. 1967); Pennsylvania, Gordon v.
Continental Casualty Co., 181 A. 574, 577-78 (Pa. 1935); Rhode Island, Cook v. American
Tubing & Webbing Co., 65 A. 641, 655 (R.I. 1905); South Dakota, Black Hills Nat'l Bank v.
Kellogg, 56 N.W. 1071, 1072-73 (S.D. 1893); Tennessee, Smith v. Mercantile Bank, 177 S.W.
72, 73 (Tenn. 1915); Texas, Wellington Oil Co. v. Maffi, 150 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Tex. 1941); Vir-
ginia, Coronado-Inglenook Land & Dev. Co. v. Black, 96 S.E.2d 737, 740 (Va. 1957); Wash-
ington, Puget Sound Nat'l Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 645 P.2d 1122, 1127
(Wash. Ct. App. 1982); Wisconsin, Milwaukee Acceptance Corp. v. Dore, 168 N.W.2d 594,
598 (Wis. 1969); West Virginia, Knobley Mountain Orchard Co. v. People's Bank, 129 S.E.
474,475-76 (W. Va. 1925); Wyoming, American Nat'l Bank v. Foodbasket, 497 P.2d 546, 548
(Wyo. 1972).
234. 85 F.2d 493 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936).
235. Id. at 494.
236. Id.
237. Id at 496.
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of the loan and the acceptance of the collateral. Therefore he
should be treated as the sole actor on behalf of the bank ... 238
The U.S. Supreme Court expanded the sole actor doctrine to cover
situations involving more than a single agent. The Court recognized that
the interests of a small number of controlling shareholders and officers
are likely to be identical to the interests of their closely held corpora-
tion.2 39 To hold otherwise, the Court said, would allow "the corporation
to become a means of fraud or a means of evading its responsibilities.
' 2 4
Neither the parties nor the court in FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers
[sic]241 addressed the sole actor doctrine. The O'Melveny court correctly
noted that the principles of corporateness apply even when one person
owns all the stock,242 but failed to consider other factors, such as the sole
actor doctrine, which might make it appropriate to disregard the corpo-
rate form. Mr. Sahni's ninety-six percent stock ownership is not by itself
a sufficient reason to impute his knowledge to American, because even
close corporations are legally distinct from their shareholders.243 Mr.
Sahni's domination and control of American, however, make him a sole
actor.244
Assuming the interests of Messrs. Sahni and Day were adverse to
American, the sole actor doctrine nonetheless requires courts to impute
to the corporation the knowledge of the 100% owners who were also the
controlling officers.245 The rationale for imputing the knowledge of a
sole representative applies to the facts of O'Melveny. In this case, there
was no one else to whom Messrs. Sahni and Day were responsible and no
superior within the corporation from whom to conceal their fraud.246 As
in Munroe v. Harriman, Messrs. Sahni and Day so dominated the man-
agement of American that they "should be treated as the sole actor[s] on
behalf of the bank."'24 7
238. Id.
239. J.J. McCaskill Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 504, 515 (1910). In McCaskill, the cor-
porate president and secretary incorporated the business, owned "a large majority of the
stock" and possessed "the entire management and control of the business and affairs." Id. In
this situation, the personal interests of the top managers were identical, and not adverse, to the
corporation. Id In imputing the officers' knowledge to the corporation, the Court empha-
sized the agents' close relationship with the corporation, rather than the agents' competing
interests. See id
240. Id
241. 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992).
242. Id at 750.
243. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 63, § 147, at 353.
244. See Munroe v. Harriman, 85 F.2d 493,496 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936).
245. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
246. See 3 FLETCHER, supra note 64, § 827.1.
247. See Munroe, 85 F.2d at 496.
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in FDIC v. Ernst &
Young24 8 applied reasoning similar to Munroe, although it did not invoke
the sole actor doctrine by name. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the
corporation possessed the same knowledge as the "sole owner who domi-
nated the board of directors."24 9 The same rationale should apply to a
case in which not one, but several members of the S&L's top manage-
ment constitute the dominant, controlling force.250 When the co-con-
spirators are at the very highest level of an organization, there is no
meaningful "duty" to convey their knowledge to higher-ups and no need
to conceal their fraud from other top managers.
The court in O'Melveny created a loophole in agency law by, in ef-
fect, considering any inside defrauder whose misdeeds lead to insolvency
"adverse" to the corporation.25 1 The courts will have to close this hole
in the future when fraudulent corporate owners discover it and attempt
to shift liability for their misdeeds to outside professionals. The federal
courts should resolve this by adopting the sole actor doctrine and the
Cenco analysis as the federal common-law rule.
If the courts impute the knowledge of corrupt S&L officers to the
corporation, the thrift itself could not recover fraud-related losses from
negligent outside professionals.252 The question remains, however,
whether the FDIC as receiver for the thrift should recover from the
outside professionals.
B. The Rights and Powers of the FDIC as Receiver
1. The powers of receivers in general
Receivership is intended to protect the rights of all interested parties
and preserve property.253 A majority of jurisdictions holds that a re-
ceiver for an insolvent bank or thrift acquires the same, and no greater,
rights in the institution's funds and assets as the institution possessed
248. 967 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992).
249. Id at 171; cf. FDIC v. Lott, 460 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that sole actor
doctrine does not apply to bank president who owns 52% of stock because he was not in "sole
control").
250. See J.J. McCaskill Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 504, 515 (1910); cf. Cenco Inc. v.
Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir.) (holding corporation responsible for top
management's collective fraud), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
251. FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers [sic], 969 F.2d 744, 750 (9th Cir. 1992).
252. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
253. Marguerite Woung, Origin and Nature of Bank and Thrift Receiverships, in BANKS
AND THRiFS, supra note 1, § 15.01, § 15.01.
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before receivership.25 4 Therefore, a defense valid against a corporation's
claim is just as valid against the receiver.255
2. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC
The U.S. Supreme Court in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC2 6
opened the door to special rights and powers for the FDIC as receiver.
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. (D'Oench, Duhme) had executed a promissory
note in favor of a bank for the purpose of inflating the bank's assets so
that it would appear solvent.25 7 The receipt for the note stated: "This
note is given with the understanding it will not be called for payment.
'25 8
When the bank failed, the note was among the bank's assets, and the
FDIC sued D'Oench, Duhme to collect on the note.259
D'Oench, Duhme defended on the basis of the receipt, which was, in
effect, a side agreement not to enforce the obligation. 2 ° However, the
court found that, because the note itself was a sham transaction that had
misled the FDIC, D'Oench, Duhme could not use the secret side agree-
ment to avoid payment on the note.261 The Supreme Court found in the
Federal Reserve Act262 "a federal policy to protect [the FDIC], and the
public funds which it administers, against misrepresentations as to the
254. Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416, 429 (1972); Morrison-
Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1222 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 408 U.S.
935 (1988); Jacobson v. FDIC, 407 F. Supp. 821, 827 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Camerer v. California
Say. & Commercial Bank, 4 Cal. 2d 159, 170, 48 P.2d 39, 44 (1935); 10 AM. JUR. 2D Banks,
supra note 45, § 764; 2 RALPH E. CLARK, LAW AND PRACTICE OF RECEIVERS § 362, at 619
(3d ed. 1959); Woung, supra note 253, § 15.07[2].
Although in England appointment of a receiver was originally solely within the power of
courts of equity, Parliament extended the power to courts of law in 1873. 1 CLARK, supra, § 4,
at 5. United States federal courts at their inception inherited equitable power from their prede-
cessor courts of equity. 1 id § 6, at 6. In 1934, the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
combined equitable and legal powers in the U.S. trial courts for all civil actions. FED. R. Civ.
P. 1, 2. There are several types of receivers: those appointed by courts, by the parties pursuant
to an agreement or contract, or by a government official pursuant to statute. 1 CLARK, supra,
§ 11, at 13-15. The FDIC is a statutory receiver. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (1988 & Supp. II
1990).
255. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1222; Tosco Corp. v. FDIC, 723 F.2d 1242, 1247 (6th
Cir. 1983); Jacobson, 407 F. Supp. at 827; Camerer, 4 Cal. 2d at 170, 48 P.2d at 44; Allen v.
Ramsay, 179 Cal. App. 2d 843, 854, 4 Cal. Rptr. 575, 582-83 (1960).
256. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
257. Id at 454.
258. Id
259. Id
260. Id at 456.
261. Id. at 461.
262. Ch. 6, § 1, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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securities or other assets in the portfolios of the banks which [the FDIC]
insures or to which it makes loans."'263
3. Extension of the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine
Courts have extended the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine to cover situa-
tions other than secret side agreements with borrowers. For example,
the FDIC as receiver can collect on a loan even if the bank itself could
not collect because of its own unlawful conduct. 2 4 In FDIC v. Gulf Life
Insurance Co. ,265 the court further expanded the doctrine by applying it
to a suit against a nonborrower debtor.
In Gulf Life, the FDIC attempted to recover amounts overpaid on
insurance policies held by two failed banks.266 The insurance company
defended on the basis that, under Alabama law, the bank would only
have been entitled to a refund of what the insurer actually received,
which was thirty-five percent of the stated premium.267 Sixty-five per-
cent of the premium went to others in the form of commissions. 26 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit fashioned a new federal
common-law rule269 based on the FDIC's need to evaluate with certainty
the worth of assets it obtains from insolvent institutions and to reduce
loss of FDIC funds. 270 The court held: "[W]hen the FDIC in its corpo-
rate capacity obtains an asset in the course of a purchase and assumption
transaction, for value, in good faith, and without knowledge of the de-
fenses, its rights in the asset are not limited by the defenses of waiver,
estoppel, or unjust enrichment."271 The court in Gulf Life stated the rule
broadly, but a narrow reading of the case based on the facts before the
court suggests the rule should be limited to negotiable instruments and
contract claims.272 The court did not mention FDIC tort claims.
The court in O'Melveny, however, greatly expanded on D'Oench,
Duhme and Gulf Life by creating a new federal common-law rule that
263. D'Oench, Duhme, 315 U.S. at 457.
264. For example, the FDIC may collect a loan that violated federal securities laws. Kilpa-
trick v. Riddle, 907 F.2d 1523 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 954 (1991); FDIC v.
Investors Assocs. X., 775 F.2d 152 (6th Cir. 1985).
265. 737 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir. 1984).
266. Id. at 1515.
267. Id at 1515-16.
268. Id at 1514-15.
269. The court of appeals held that federal common law governed the defenses allowed
because "the rights and obligations of the FDIC are at stake." Id. at 1517.
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FDIC tort claims are not subject to equitable defenses.2 73 The bases for
the rule, according to the O'Melveny court, are: (1) The FDIC is invol-
untarily "thrust into" the insolvent thrift's shoes;274 and (2) the "intri-
cate regulatory scheme" for the protection of depositors would be
frustrated if the FDIC were unable to recover for negligence.275 Neither
rationale is persuasive.276
Federal law generally requires the FDIC to act as receiver for failed
thrifts.2 77 Absent a federal statute, however, courts have the equitable
power to appoint a receiver for an insolvent thrift.2 7 Whether court-
appointed or statutory, the receiver's role and function is to preserve as-
sets for the benefit of depositors and creditors.279 Therefore, the exist-
ence of a statute that makes the FDIC an involuntary receiver cannot
justify the O'Melveny court's rule.
Second, the Ninth Circuit overstates the extent to which the insider
fraud defense would block FDIC professional liability suits. For exam-
ple, the court at one point describes the professionals as "those who may
have aided and abetted [insiders] in bringing about the disaster.
280
Courts that have allowed an insider fraud defense have only applied the
defense in cases of a professional's nonintentional or nonknowing con-
duct,28 1 not aiding and abetting. O'Melveny was charged with negli-
273. FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers [sic], 969 F.2d 744, 751-52 (9th Cir. 1992).
274. It at 751.
-275. Id. at 752.
276. The U.S. district court in FSLIC v. McGinnis, Juban, Bevan, Mullins & Patterson, 808
F. Supp. 1263 (E.D. La. 1992), stated the argument for the FDIC more effectively:
[W]hen litigating as receiver of a failed institution, the FDIC has a special role quite
unlike that of the typical private plaintiff. The FDIC is duty-bound in making deci-
sions regarding the disposition of a failed institution, its assets, and its claims to
advance "the best interests of the institution, the depositors of such institution, and
the [FDIC]." It acts at all times to "preserve and conserve the assets and property of
[the] institution," for the benefit of the failed institution's creditors and the insurance
fund.
Id. at 1278 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)
(Supp. III 1991)). The McGinnis, Juban court made a better argument, but the logic suffers
from the same weakness as the O'Melveny decision. See infra notes 277-79 and accompanying
text.
277. See supra note 42.
278. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
279. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
280. O'Melveny, 969 F.2d at 748.
281. See, eg., FDIC v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992) (allowing defense for
negligent accountants); Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir.) (same),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982). The insider fraud defense should not apply to suits which
allege the professional participated in or aided and abetted fraud because one of the principal
justifications for the defense is balancing equities and policy considerations. See infra part
IV.C.
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gence, not intentional or knowing conduct.28 2 The insider fraud defense
is further limited to those cases in which the top managers turned the
S&L into "an engine of theft"'283 or dominated and controlled the institu-
tion as the thrift's alter ego.284
The O'Melveny rule greatly expands the protection given to the
FDIC in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC.285  However, D'Oench,
Duhme and O'Melveny differ factually. First, in D'Oench, Duhme, the
court allowed the FDIC to recover on a promissory note that the bank
itself would have been unable to collect because of a secret side agree-
ment with the borrower.28 6 Thus, D'Oench, Duhme concerned the type
of negotiable, financial instrument that comprises the bulk of bank and
S&L assets. O'Melveny involved a nonfinancial, noncontractual and un-
common S&L "asset"-the right to bring a malpractice suit. Yet the
O'Melveny court does not discuss this difference.
Second, in D'Oench, Duhme, the borrower knew he was entering
into a sham transaction28 7 and therefore either was reckless or aided and
abetted bank fraud. In contrast, the O'Melveny firm was not charged
with aiding and abetting fraud because it was unaware of any fraud. At
most, O'Melveny was negligent in failing to uncover the fraud.288
4. Applying the Kimbell Foods analysis
The majority state rule subjects receivers to the same defenses as the
failed institution.289 Therefore, the courts must create a contrary federal
common-law rule to give the FDIC greater rights. When a federal court
creates a rule that differs from state law, it should apply the three-part
analysis used in United States v. Kimbell Foods.290 Neither the
282. O'Melveny, 969 F.2d at 745-46.
283. Cenco, 686 F.2d at 454.
284. 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency, supra note 75, § 292, at 797-98.
285. 315 U.S. 447 (1942). One commentator has argued the basic holding of D'Oench,
Duhme is unfair because the bank borrower "has been forced to bear more than his fair share
of responsibility for the recent economic downturn and resulting loan losses as well as those
caused by the nonfeasance and/or malfeasance of the institutions and their regulators." Rich-
ard E. Flint, Why D'Oench, Duhme? An Economic, Legal, and Philosophical Critique of a
Failed Bank Policy, 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 465, 478 (1992). Professor Flint, however, does not
discuss the extension of the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine to nonborrower defendants such as
negligent professionals.
286. See 315 U.S. at 461.
287. Id. at 454.
288. See FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers [sic], 969 F.2d 744, 746, 752 (9th Cir. 1992).
289. Supra notes 254-55.
290. 440 U.S. 715, 728-29 (1979); see supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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O'Melveny nor the Ernst & Young courts formally applied the entire
Kimbell Foods test.2 91
First, does the issue require a "nationally uniform body of law"?292
The court in O'Melveny apparently concluded that the banking and S&L
insurance system is a national program that requires uniformity to be
effective.293 However, uniformity was not at stake in this case because
the majority state rule on the power of receivers is nearly uniform,294 so
the real issue was whether there should be a different federal rule.
Second, would the use of state law obstruct the "specific" aims of
the FDIC?2 9' The general aims of the FDIC are to insure bank and S&L
deposits and to protect the insurance fund. Allowing the insider fraud
defense eliminates some recoveries from outside professionals. In a gen-
eral sense, then, allowing the defense against the FDIC frustrates to a
small degree the FDIC's goal of preserving the bank and S&L insurance
funds. The O'Melveny court adopted this broad view of FDIC objec-
tives.296 While the FDIC has authority to sue negligent professionals,
Congress has not specifically empowered the FDIC to override state-law
defenses. Thus, the insider fraud defense does not obstruct any specific
FDIC goals.2 97
Third, to what extent would special rights and powers for the FDIC
as receiver disrupt state law commercial relationships?9 ' Holding attor-
neys and accountants liable for failing to stop insider fraud creates a new
291. Cf. FSLIC v. McGinnis, Juban, Bevan, Mullins & Patterson, 808 F. Supp. 1263, 1276-
79 (E.D. La. 1992) (applying Kimbell Foods analysis to decide whether state rule on credit for
partial settlements applies to FSLIC attorney malpractice suit). The McGinnis, Juban court
considered whether Louisiana's proportionate-reduction rule applied to a $60 million settle-
ment with the thrift's officers and directors. Id. at 1276. In Louisiana, the damages award
would be reduced by the proportion of fault attributed to the settling defendants. Id. The
court concluded that federal common law applied, id, and rejected the state rule because
"[w]hen the FDIC is involved . . . '[a]scertainment of the relative culpability of joint
tortfeasors is overshadowed by the goal of making the FDIC as whole as feasible.'" Id at
1279 (second alteration in original) (quoting FDIC v. Geldermann, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 524, 529
(W.D. Okla. 1990), rev'd, 975 F.2d 695 (10th Cir. 1992)).
292. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728.
293. See O'Melveny, 969 F.2d at 751-52.
294. The majority rule is long standing and entrenched. See, eg., Allen v. Todd, 12 Cal.
App. 3d 654, 657, 90 Cal. Rptr. 807, 809 (1970); Martin v. General Am. Casualty Co., 76 So.
2d 537, 540 (La. 1954); Wellbro Bldg. Co. v. McConnico, 421 P.2d 837, 840 (Okla. 1966);
Warner v. Conn, 32 A.2d 740, 741 (Pa. 1943); Morse Electro Prods. Corp. v. Beneficial Indus.
Loan Co., 579 P.2d 1341, 1342 (Wash. 1978); Barber v. Reina Nash Motor Co., 260 P.2d 928,
934 (Wyo. 1953); 65 AM. JUR. 2D Receivers § 165 (1972); 2 CLARK, supra note 254, § 362.
295. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728.
296. O'Melveny, 969 F.2d at 752.
297. See FDIC v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 742 F. Supp. 612, 614 (M.D. Fla. 1990);
infra note 304 and accompanying text.
298. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728-29.
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duty to blow the whistle on clients that is diametrically opposed to client
confidentiality.299 Such a duty would significantly interfere with state-
law professional relationships.
The Ninth Circuit in O'Melveny slavishly applied D'Oench, Duhme
without fully considering the second and third factors in the Kimbell
Foods analysis. Based on the near uniformity of state law on receivers,
the lack of specific legislative intent to override state-law tort defenses
and the potential disruption of state-law relationships between profes-
sionals and clients, courts should not extend the D'Oench, Duhme doc-
trine to professional negligence claims.
5. The D'Oench, Duhme doctrine should be limited
Despite the Gulf Life and O'Melveny decisions, not all courts have
agreed with the FDIC's expansive view of the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine.
In FDIC v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, the FDIC sued the auditors of
Park Bank for negligence.3" The auditors asserted the comparative or
contributory negligence of the Park Bank officers as a defense.30 1 The
FDIC argued that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine created "special federal
rules allowing the FDIC to carry out its function of attempting to stabi-
lize the national banking system."302 However, the U.S. district court
found that the special protection afforded the FDIC under D'Oench,
Duhme was limited mainly to secret side agreements and fraud by former
bank officials vis-a-vis defaulted borrowers of the bank.30 3 Discussing
comparative negligence, the district court in Cherry, Bekaert stated:
[T]he FDIC does not cite any statutory authority affording it
special protection from this defense, and.., this Court declines
to speculate that Congress contemplated that negligence suits
against third party defendants are a necessary part of the recov-
ery of the insurance fund. Therefore, the Court finds that
Cherry Bekaert may assert its affirmative defenses against the
FDIC in this action.3°
In FDIC v. Jenkins,3 ° s the FDIC argued that its negligence claims
against a bank's attorneys and accountants should have priority over
299. See infra part IV.C.2-3.
300. 742 F. Supp. at 613.
301. Id
302. Id at 614.
303. Id at 614-15 (citing FDIC v. Harrison, 735 F.2d 408, 412 n.6 (11th Cir. 1984)).
304. Id at 614. In FDIC v. Carter, 701 F. Supp. 730 (C.D. Cal. 1987), the district court
also declined to extend the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine. Id. at 736 (holding that failure to
mitigate damages is valid defense to FDIC claims).
305. 888 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1989).
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similar suits filed by the bank's shareholders. °" The FDIC contended
that minimizing insurance fund losses by suing negligent professionals
was an express goal of the FDIC's statutory framework.30 7 Finding no
authority for the FDIC's "expansive view" of its powers, the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument.308 The court
stated that federal law does not "compel" the FDIC to sue negligent
professionals and that Congress did not envision such suits as "a neces-
sary part of the recovery to the deposit insurance fund. ' 3°9 Exercising
judicial restraint, the court said a federal rule giving the FDIC priority
over shareholders' lawsuits "will have to come from Congress, not this
Court."310
The principles of judicial restraint and federalism caution against
creating a federal rule hostile to a majority state rule. -The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adopted this rationale in Ernst & Young,
finding that "[n]o statutory justification or public policy exists to treat
the FDIC differently from other assignees.
'311
C. The Insider Fraud Defense and Public Policy
1. Purposes of professional negligence liability
The courts must address the policy questions raised by the insider
fraud defense. The decision in FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers [sic] 312 re-
lied largely on the important public policy goal of assisting the S&L
bailout.313 The court concluded that even if the wrongdoing benefitted
the corporation, "the insiders' conduct is still not attributable to the cor-
poration if a recovery by the plaintiff would serve the objectives of tort
liability by properly compensating the victims of the wrongdoing and
deterring future wrongdoing. ' 31a The court hastily discussed these
broad policy issues without considering countervailing policies, such as
the importance of the attorney-client relationship.31 5
306. Id. at 1538-39.
307. Id. at 1540-41.
308. Id. at 1543.
309. Id. at 1546.
310. Id.
311. FDIC v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. 1992).
312. 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992).
313. See id at 748, 752.
314. Id at 750 (citing Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1348 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1002 (1983); Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 455 (7th Cir.), cerL denied,
459 U.S. 880 (1982)).
315. See infra part IV.C.2-3.
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Compensating the FDIC for losses is certainly important because of
the central role deposit insurance plays in the national savings and bank-
ing system. The FDIC, however, is not powerless and, perhaps, not en-
tirely blameless. The FDIC/FSLIC has the right and responsibility to
examine thrifts' books and halt unsound lending practices.3 16  The
agency should have protected the insurance fund and the national thrift
and banking system from fraudulent S&L owners such as Mr. Sahni
before insolvency occurred.
Tort liability also seeks to deter wrongdoing. 31 7 The wrongdoing in
O'Melveny was primarily Messrs. Sahni's and Day's fraud and seconda-
rily O'Melveny's possible negligence. The alleged negligent omission by
O'Melveny was its failure to uncover the financial information that
American's owners were concealing from regulators and others.318 The
court concluded that imposing liability would cause O'Melveny and
other professionals to be more careful in the future.319 Courts are under-
standably reluctant to create a rule that would encourage professionals to
"look the other way," thereby acting with wilful ignorance, when there is
a hint of client fraud.
The O'Melveny court, however, distorted agency law so as to allow
the defrauders to conceal material facts from outside professionals and
then sue the professionals for malpractice when they fail to discover the
fraud.320 Such a rule deters negligence by professionals at the expense of
encouraging fraud by corporate clients. As a practical matter, the deter-
rence value of the O'Melveny rule is limited when professionals are deal-
ing with closely held corporations. As both O'Melveny and FDIC v.
Ernst & Young 32 1 show, when top management controls the board of
directors, it can easily conceal its fraud from outside professionals.322 In
these situations, corporate power is concentrated in just a few hands.323
316. See supra note 1.
317. KEETON ET AL., supra note 66, § 4, at 25.
318. American changed auditors twice in order to forestall releasing financial statements
that would show its insolvency. O'Melveny, 969 F.2d at 746. When another law firm perform-
ing work on other real estate syndications was informed by an auditor of American's likely
insolvency, American stopped using that firm and hired O'Melveny instead. Id. at 747.
319. See id. at 750 (citing Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1348 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1002 (1983)).
320. See supra part IV.A.4.
321. 967 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992).
322. See Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir.) (stating that "the
number and high rank of the managers involved... complicated the task of discovery" for the
auditors), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
323. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 63, § 147, at 353.
[T]he rule that corporateness will be sustained only so long as it is used for legitimate
purposes has special significance when applied to the one-person, family, or other
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Imposing liability on the outside professional achieves some valid
tort and policy objectives, but the balance of gain and loss is much closer
than the court's one-sided analysis in O'Melveny suggested. A full
weighing of the issues requires consideration of extrinsic policies, partic-
ularly the professional-client relationship.
2. The professional-client relationship
In general, shifting the cost of the S&L bailout onto the outside pro-
fessional comes at the expense of the professional-client relationship. A
federal common-law rule giving the FDIC the power to overcome the
insider fraud defense will make attorneys and accountants reluctant to
work for financially shaky S&Ls-whether they are fraudulent or hon-
est-because once a thrift becomes insolvent, the potential liability for
the professional increases.324 The greater liability stems from the risk of
being held accountable by the FDIC for the concealed fraud of top man-
agement. Professionals will not be as concerned about the risk of con-
cealed fraud while the S&L is financially healthy because the thrift, if not
under FDIC receivership, will generally be barred from recovering for
losses caused by its own fraudulent controlling managers.325
The policy of protecting the professional-client relationship326 ap-
plies with particular urgency to the financially troubled client. An S&L
on the skids, even one with honest management, has more incentive than
a healthy thrift to skirt the law if management views this as the only hope
closely-held corporation. Such an enterprise concentrates control and superior
knowledge in the principal shareholder or shareholders and thereby lends itself to
illegitimate use.
li
324. See Kelley Holland et al., Big Six Firms Are Firing Clients, Bus. WK., Mar. 1, 1993, at
76 ("Huge lawsuits make them choosy about whom they'll audit."). For example, Ernst &
Young withdrew from auditing Tehama County Bank in Red Bluff, California. Id. According
to Lawrence A. Weinbach, chief executive officer of Arthur Andersen & Co., "'Liability risk
has gone so far, it's not worth the risk to audit some... small banks.'" Id
325. See supra part IV.A. However, in addition to the O'Melveny court's expansion of the
powers of the FDIC as receiver, the O'Melveny rule on imputing knowledge could allow a
fraudulently managed thrift to recover from its accountants or attorneys before FDIC receiv-
ership. See supra note 226.
326. Courts and lawmakers have been highly deferential to the accountant-client and attor-
ney-client relationship, as evidenced by the privileges against testifying about client confi-
dences. See 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2286, at 532-33
& 533 n.22 (accountant-client privilege), §§ 2290-2291 (attorney-client privilege) (John T. Mc-
Naughton rev. ed. 1961 & Supp. 1991). The attorney-client privilege is based on the value of
legal counsel to individual clients and the need for full disclosure by the client to maximize the
benefit of the attorney's advice. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.1.3
(1986). Presumably, clients would, in some cases, withhold relevant but incriminating infor-
mation if they believed it could somehow be used against them. Id. The same policy underlies
the professional's ethical duty of confidentiality. Id; see infra part IV.C.3.
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for survival. This type of client-desperate but not intent on fraud or
legal violations-can benefit most from competent professional advice.
On the basis of an inadequate balancing of equities and policy con-
cerns, the O'Melveny court decided that outside professionals are, in ef-
fect, the insurers of their clients' misdeeds if the client ends up in FDIC
receivership. This rule will certainly make it more difficult for a financial
institution to secure professional advice as it approaches insolvency.
Shifting S&L losses onto professionals will have an even more direct
impact on the professional-client relationship by creating a strong incen-
tive, if not a duty, to break confidences. Under the O'Melveny rule, a
professional who uncovers fraud may be held liable if he or she fails to
stop it. If a client cannot be persuaded to voluntarily abandon unlawful
conduct, the professional faces a difficult choice: withdraw327 and keep
quiet, or breach the duty of client confidentiality by reporting the client
to regulators.328 The ethical rules could subject an attorney to discipline
for breaching confidences, while the O'Melveny rule could make an attor-
ney liable if he or she does not report the conduct. The O'Melveny rule is
designed to reduce the harm caused by fraudulent S&Ls, but it fas to
take into account the intricate balancing attempted by the ethical rules.
Despite the protection confidentiality gives some unlawful clients, the
ethical rules almost always require confidentiality because of the impor-
tance of the professional-client relationship.329
3. Duty of confidentiality when a professional uncovers fraud
Professional rules of confidentiality generally prohibit disclosing cli-
ent confidences or secrets. 3 Usually, the only course allowed to an at-
torney or accountant who has discovered corporate fraud is to advise the
corporation's top managers or board of directors to abandon the unlaw-
ful conduct, and if that fails, to withdraw from the professional-client
relationship.331
327. The attorney, in some cases, must withdraw. See infra part IV.C.3.
328. See infra part IV.C.3.
329. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. (1992); MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1981).
330. For attorneys' ethical duty of confidentiality, see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCr Rule 1.6; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101; Monse,
supra note 47, 15-27. For accountants' ethical duty of confidentiality, see CAL. CODE REGS.
tit. 16, § 54 (1992); AMERICAN INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL ETHICS § 301 (1977).
331. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(a)(1); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY DR 2-110(3)(2), DR 7-102(B)(1).
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The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct 32 and Model Code of Professional Responsibility3 a allow limited
exceptions to the duty of confidentiality. 334 The Model Code allows, but
does not require, disclosure of a client's secrets without his or her con-
sent to the extent "necessary to prevent [a] crime. ' 3 5 This provision
gives attorneys discretion to report a client's intention to violate criminal
banking or S&L laws in the future, but confidentiality must be main-
tained as to any past crimes or intent to violate civil statutes or regula-
tions. 336  The Model Rules, which are more restrictive, permit
discretionary disclosure without the client's consent "to prevent the cli-
ent from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to
result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm. ' 337
An attorney who has discovered noncriminal fraud by a client, how-
ever, must not participate in it. 3 3 8 The attorney must try to persuade the
client to act lawfuy.33 9 If the attorney cannot persuade the client to
332. Thirty-five states and the District of Columbia have adopted a version of the Model
Rules, making it the majority approach to legal ethics. See 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. &
W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § AP4:107, at 1269-70 (2d ed. Supp. 1992). The states are: Ari-
zona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
vada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Id
333. Four states still follow a modified version of the Model Code: Massachusetts, Oregon,
Virginia and New York. See id § AP4:101, at 1255 n.1.
334. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1); MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 4-101(C)(3). California, which has adopted neither the
Model Code nor the Model Rules, does not include any stated exception to its rule on client
confidentiality. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 1990 & Supp. 1993) (stating it
is attorney's duty "[t]o maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or
herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client").
335. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3). Other Model
Code exceptions to client confidentiality include disclosure: with the informed consent of the
client, id DR 4-101(C)(1); when required by law, court order, or the disciplinary rules, id. DR
4-101(C)(2); and to collect a fee or defend accusations of wrongful conduct against the attor-
ney, id DR 4-101(C)(4).
336. See id. DR 4-101(C)(3); WOLFRAM, supra note 326, § 12.6.4, at 668-69. Most banking
and S&L statutes and regulations provide only civil penalties. For example, the FDIC brought
only civil charges against Messrs. Sahni and Day of American, and the suit was settled without
admission of liability. See supra note 76. However, the Justice Department prosecuted Mr.
Woods, owner of Western. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
337. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1). The Model Rules also
allow disclosure without the client's consent for the attorney's defense of criminal or civil
charges or in an attorney's claim against the client. Id Rule 1.6(b)(2).
338. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.2(d), 3.3(a)(2), 4.1; MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-102(A)(7).
339. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1).
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follow the law, the attorney in some cases must withdraw.3" The Cali-
fornia Rules of Professional Conduct, for example, establish a clear proto-
col if the attorney believes an agent of a corporate client is breaking the
law.341 The California rule makes clear that a legal violation by a corpo-
rate agent is not grounds for breaching confidentiality.3 42 The attorney
"may take such actions as appear... to be in the best lawful interest of
the organization," such as urging reconsideration or referring the matter
to a higher corporate authority.343 If these steps fail to stop the unlawful
conduct, "the [attorney's] response is limited to the [attorney's] right,
and, where appropriate, duty to resign.""
4. Causation and the duty of confidentiality
Finally, the duty of confidentiality is a factor in determining causa-
tion.34  Allegations of professional negligence in failing to uncover in-
sider S&L fraud raise the question of whether attorneys or accountants
could have stopped the conduct or prevented the harm. Withdrawal,
which is the most extreme measure consistent with confidentiality, will
not necessarily prevent illegal activity or financial loss. The facts of
O'Melveny are telling. American went through three accounting firms
and two law firms in its final year of existence, apparently terminating
any firm that became suspicious of its financial condition. 346
340. See CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-700(B) (West Supp. 1992);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(a)(1); MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-1 10(B)(2).
341. See CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-600 (West Supp. 1992); see also
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(b) (stating that when representing
organization, attorney who uncovers unlawful conduct must act "to minimize... the risk of
revealing information relating to the representation to persons outside the organization").
342. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-600(B) (citing California statute on
client confidentiality, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 1990 & Supp. 1993)).
343. Id.
344. Id Rule 3-600(C) (emphasis added). Despite the position of the Model Rules, the
Model Code, and the California Rules of Professional Conduct, some bank and thrift regula-
tors claim that lawyers have a duty to inform regulators of client violations. See FDIC Seeks
$300 Million in Suit Against Law Firm; Alleges Malpractice, Negligence, 54 Banking Rep.
(BNA) 547 (Mar. 26, 1990) (reporting FDIC suit asserting law firm's duty "to disclose mate-
rial information... to the Bank's accountants and regulators"); Speech by OTS Chief Counsel
Weinstein on Duties of Depository Institution Fiduciaries, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 510, 512
(Sept. 24, 1990) (asserting S&L directors and fiduciaries owe duty to regulators). No court has
as yet endorsed a duty to report client wrongdoing.
345. Unlike the preceding discussion of the professional-client relationship as an extrinsic
policy concern, causation is an intrinsic issue in every negligence case.
346. FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers [sic], 969 F.2d 744, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1992). American
terminated Touche Ross & Co. in April 1985, allegedly because the firm was "too expensive."
Id at 746. In October of the same year, when Arthur Young & Co. expressed concern over
American's financial condition, it was replaced with Coopers & Lybrand. Id. Before
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The American case demonstrates that a professional's withdrawal
will not stop corporate officers who are determined to commit fraud.347
American may represent an extreme example, but some professionals do
not think so. One banking lawyer wrote: "[L]awyers and accountants
work for management on a day-to-day basis. If a lawyer or accountant
ever said he or she was going directly to the board of directors, the next
lawyer or accountant would be there in a wink, as a replacement. '348 In
a closely held corporation such as American, "going directly to the
board" would most likely be futile because the board would be domi-
nated by the likes of Messrs. Sahni and Day and their proxies.
The limits placed on attorneys and accountants by their ethical duty
of confidentiality make it speculative that a professional could actually
stop insider S&L fraud if he or she uncovered it. Causation is a neces-
sary element of the tort of professional negligence.349 Unless a plaintiff
can prove, based on more than speculation, that the fraud would not
have succeeded but for the professional's negligence, the plaintiff must
lose.35o
V. CONCLUSION
Should the lawyers and accountants for the fictional Jefferson
S&L 351 pay? Legal and policy considerations suggest they should not.
While FDIC litigation against professionals is an appropriate response to
the massive S&L crisis, the public policy in favor of recovering losses of
insured deposits does not outweigh the public interest in orderly, logical
and consistent development of the law of agency and the D'Oench,
O'Melveny, American had hired the law firm Rogers & Wells to prepare other real estate
syndication documents, but Rogers & Wells required that a current balance sheet for the thrift
be given to investors. Id at 746-47. American replaced Rogers & Wells with O'Melveny. Id.
at 747.
347. See id. at 746-47.
348. Naegele, supra note 25, at 5. Mr. Naegele, former counsel to the Senate Banking Com-
mittee, experienced an FDIC professional liability suit as a defendant. The suit settled with
the FDIC for $4.6 million in 1989. FDIC, supra note 22 at 1.
349. See supra note 36.
350. KEETON ET AL., supra note 66, § 41, at 265 ("An act or an omission is not regarded as
a cause of an event if the particular event would have occurred without it."); see FDIC v.
Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166, 172 (5th Cir. 1992) (affirming summary judgment for account-
ants because "the audit was not a cause of the losses"); Stratton v. Miller, 113 B.R. 205, 210
(D. Md. 1989) (holding that causation was not proved because it was speculative that loss
would have been prevented if attorneys had advised board of directors of misconduct), affid
sub nom. In re First Am. Mortgage Co., 900 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
351. See supra part I.
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Duhme doctrine. "In our zeal to exact reparations [for the S&L crisis]
... we must not be blinded to the requirements of the law .... .352
Fraud committed by the controlling officers of an S&L is generally
fraud on behalf of the corporation, and the corporate entity should be
held accountable for it. By attributing the knowledge and conduct of the
fraudulent officers to the corporation, professionals may avail themselves
of state law defenses such as estoppel, in par delicto and contributory or
comparative negligence.
Under the majority rule, receivers are subject to the same defenses
as the insolvent institution. As a matter of federal common law, the
FDIC should not be immune to these defenses. This is the appropriate
federal rule because state receivership law provides uniformity, there is
no specific legislative intent to override state tort law and granting the
FDIC special rights would disrupt the professional-client relationship.
The argument for the insider fraud defense in cases similar to
O'Melveny, Ernst & Young, and the fictional Jefferson S&L, where a
fraudulent, dominant shareholder managed the thrift,353 is compelling
for practical reasons as well. Such fraud is easily concealable, and if it is
discovered, outside professionals have little power to stop it because of
their duty of confidentiality.
David B. Newdorf*
352. FSLIC v. Molinaro, 889 F.2d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 1989).
353. See FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers [sic], 969 F.2d 744, 746 ("The parties agree that
Sahni [chairman, chief executive officer and 96% stockholder], Day [president and 4% stock-
holder] and Wyn Pope, Executive Vice President of [American] had intentionally and fraudu-
lently overvalued [American's] assets, engaged in the sham sale of assets in order to create
inflated 'profits' and generally 'cook[ed] the books."' (final alteration in original) (quoting
parties' stipulation)); Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d at 168 ("Woods [the 100% owner] effectively
dominated and controlled Western.").
* This Comment is dedicated to my wife, Cheryl Sindel, for her wise counsel on matters
of the heart and the world. Her sacrifice and encouragement made this possible. I would also
like to thank professors David Burcham, David Leonard and Therese Maynard for their
comments.
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